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a b s t r a c t
Is Google in its quest for search engine optimization through the creation of new tech-
nologies, which not only improves its search algorithms but also refines its search func-
tions for users, doing it in a manner that makes it a perpetrator of primary copyright
infringement or an invaluable facilitator for Internet functionality? How should the
balance of interests in the treatment of creative works be recalibrated in the face of
changes in search engine technology and operations, and the disputes that have arisen
within the last decade in the context of the digital age and its needs? Using Google as a case
study, this paper will look at the two main areas of dispute over the operations of infor-
mation locator tools and services that either threatens search engine functionality and
efficiency or weakens copyright holders’ exclusive rights. It proposes a concerted set of
solutions through a reassessment and amendment of copyright law to optimize the social
benefits and objectives of both the copyright regime and technological innovations in the
electronic model of information archiving, indexing and delivery. A fair distribution of
responsibilities and allocation of rights and liabilities will be suggested. In the process, due
consideration will be given to both public and private interests, with the former taking
precedence; while the recommended solutions will be made within the currently outdated
framework for Internet intermediary protection (i.e. safe harbor laws) and exceptions (i.e.
specific statutory exemptions and the general fair use defense) under the existing copy-
right regime. Thus, the proposed changes will be far reaching without being too radical
a departure from current law, an evolution that will likely be more acceptable and realistic
a solution to the problem.
This paper is published in two parts. Part One of this paper will deal with the challenges to
the copyright regime posed by the operations and technology behind the Google Images
Search Engine, while Part Two that will be published in the subsequent edition of the CLSR
will assess the benefits of the Google Books Search Project vis-a`-vis the effects it will have
on the scope of copyright protection. Recommendations are made to copyright law to
accommodate both functions while generally preserving the main objectives of copyright
protection.
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1. General introduction: the expansion of
search engine functions and legal impediments
1.1. Introduction: the clone wars between Google and the
creative empire
It is trite to say that the law lags behind technology but never is it
more apparent than in the case of copyright law with respect to
the rapid development of information technology. Although
there have been amendments and changes to the law to recon-
cile the public and private interests involved in copyright law to
accommodate significant developments in digital technology,
these legal reforms have only been partially successful in
resolving the differences between them and in keeping disputes
outside of the judicial arena. Safe harbor laws or limitation of
liability laws for Internet intermediaries were enacted at a time
when technology was simpler and their functions less varied.
They have largely remained unchanged despite the rapid
changes in the role and function of such intermediaries in rela-
tion to the technologies that they use. Fundamental copyright
laws including the types of exclusive rights protected and the
exceptions to infringement of such rights, in particular the fair
use doctrine, were also crafted further back in time before
information technology even existed. Although they are still
useful in themodern context and there have been some general
amendmentsmade to safeguard thecore Internet functionalities
from infringement, these are not comprehensive enough, as
evidenced by the increasing volume of disputes over time.
Similarly, cases interpreting such provisions have been trying to
apply them, and in some cases update the laws, to keep them in
line with technological progress; but with each step in judicial
activism to supplement the current statutory law, such as the
development andapplicationof secondary infringement and fair
use tests, new changes soon take place that still render the
existing laws inadequate to the needs of the Internet.
In relation to search engines, the development froma single
basic model to a multi-faceted one presents unique challenges
to copyright policy and law. Google initially started as a general
search engine and largely dealt with information in all forms
withina singleWebsearch.Thiswasbecausemostof theearlier
types ofmaterials uploaded onto theWWWwere in the formof
literary information, limitedbybandwidth in speedandvolume
as well as in availability by level of usage and digitization of
format. As things changed and the types of work began to
encompass all forms of creative works, the search engines’
functions also expanded and became more nuanced and
sophisticated. Searches for different types of work were differ-
entiated, and more significantly, the manner of the storage-
catalog-display-access process became different for each form
of work. Google’s technological changes to its business model
were both driven by market demand and advancements in
Internet usage andWWWaccessibility as a whole.1
Matters are further complicated as Internet entities are not
easily categorized according to their objectives and operations.
For example, Google Videos (and now Google TV), Google
Music, Finance, Shopping, Maps and Blogs are presented as
new specialized search engines dedicated to various forms and
manifestations of creative works or user services. Google’s
diversification of its business portfolio to search-related func-
tions also adds to the issues. For example, while its subsidiary
YouTube operates also as a music and video search engine, it
additionally provides audio-visual storage and streaming as
well as advertising facilities. The Google Books Search engine
(like Google News and Scholar) further categorizes information
according to form but in a technically different and contro-
versial manner, with Google functioning as an archiver,
indexer and middleman linking the reader or buyer to authors
or booksellers. In the process, Google also caches some online
content and render them available to its users even after the
original website copy is taken down. The Google Images Search
function allows the search for photos and pictures available
online separate from the context of the literary works and
audioevideo images that it may relate to, as thumbnails and
screen captures respectively. It also provides users with the
option of accessing the full-size image either in the website
hosting that image or in a different browser. Table 1 presents
an overview of the different legal implications of Google’s
search engines for different types of works and their possible
outcome under current law.2
The case studies in this paper will make clear that Google
currently functions based on an opt-out model of copyright
law, which is an inversion of the way that copyright law
operates today.3 It fundamentally conflicts with the existing
framework of the copyright regime, which requires an opting-
in to private relinquishment of rights by the rights holders
themselves. Google justifies its activities in relation to copy-
righted works as a necessity; that is, in the preparations for or
performance of its functions, it operates on the basis that it
has a legitimate basis to usurp and perform one or more
exclusive rights that copyright law traditionally reserves to
copyright owners, which generally requires their prior release
or transfer to a third party through private arrangements. The
model adopted determines the balance of initial rights, and
1 The latest innovation by Google is the Google Instant
Previews, which is another way to make Google search results
even more user-friendly. See e.g., J.R. Raphael, Google Instant
Previews: A Hands-On Tour (PC World, 10 November, 2010), avail-
able at: http://www.pcworld.com/article/210198/google_instant_
previews_a_handson_tour.html.
2 An action for infringement taken by a copyright holder
against an Internet intermediary like Google normally involves
a three-step approach under the current copyright regime: The
rights implicated; the potential safe harbors, the type of
infringement and statutory defenses. The latter two are distinct
although some of their legal requirements, and relevant factual
evidence or proof, do overlap; in particular, the elements of
knowledge and intention as well as the action and activities
concerned.
3 See e.g., Jennifer Suzanne Bresson Bisk, Book Search Is Beau-
tiful?: An Analysis of Whether Google Book Search Violates
International Copyright Law, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 271, 275e280
(2007), on the confines of the International copyright consensus
under which Google can operate its ‘opt-out’ regime, especially
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and the limitations that
require exceptions that do not conflict with the normal exploi-
tation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the creator.
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underlies the power struggle between the two sides. Because
copyright law automatically and by default grants rights to
authors or publishers, it is therefore the case that disputes
over rights and liabilities over this fundamental issue would
originate from the copyright owner as plaintiff and places
search engines functioning like Google largely on the defen-
sive insofar as a court litigation is concerned. Google does not
have the legal standing to take any pre-emptive steps to
justify the legality of its operations, but it is reactionary in the
sense that only if and when action is threatened or a case is
brought against it can seek a judgment that would legitimize
its activities, either on the basis of statutory protection or
exemption or both. This creates an atmosphere of uncertainty
for technology creators and copyright owners alike.
In order to more easily identify where the issues lie with
a view to a comprehensive solution to these problems, Goo-
gle’s role and operations vis-a-vis the various forms of works
in its search engines will have to be separately scrutinized.
This is because the law addresses not so much the form that
a legal entity takes but rather its objectives and functions; that
is, its level of knowledge and forms of practices respectively.
On the matter of statutory protections, Google will be judged
as an “information locator tool” generally on the basis of its
level of control over third party material and potentially
primary infringing activities as well as whether it operates as
a first party infringer itself. The legitimacy of its control and
involvement in any online activity by a third party is the key
element for its eligibility to existing statutory immunity or
otherwise. On the issue of its defenses, Google will be judged
based on its own actions and the form of infringing activity in
relation to the type of work concerned against the existing
statutory exemptions under copyright law, in particular the
general fair use exception. Important considerations here,
other than the existing fair use factors, include the social
benefits and ‘disbenefits’ of its actions to society, whether and
to what extent it is integral to its primary function as a search
engine, the ‘value-add’ of the function, the alternatives
available, the technological limitations to infringement and
the potential benefits and detriment to copyright holders.
1.2. The clone wars4
Google Inc. primarily deals as an Internet intermediary
between third parties, serving as a gateway or reference for
one (the User) and as a platform for outreach for the other (the
Poster), irrespective of whether it is specifically between
a business and consumer (B2C) or generally between other
types of content providers and Internet users. It essentially
handles content and creative works in various ways such as
its storage, indexing and transfer. Thus, its main antagonists
are the authorities in terms of the regulation of content in
general, and intellectual property rights holders in relation to
the treatment of creativeworks. The former seeks control over
content for political and socio-cultural regulation, while the
latter seeks protection of proprietary content and related
moral rights and financial interests.
Google began innocuously enough as an indexing and
information locator tool pledged to “do no evil”. However, for
its survival and continued relevance as a technological
pioneer and to maintain its advantage as market leader in its
field of operation, Google Inc. has strategically taken a multi-
pronged approach to its evolution. Google began to do several
things in the newmillennium: First it expanded its operations
trans-nationally for a global reach; second, Google also
diversified its roles, functions and capacity in relation to and
revolving around its core function as an information location
service; and third, in order to fund its operations and also to
fulfill its mandate or duties as a corporate entity, Google also
started and acquired businesses that are related or comple-
mentary to its search engine operations including compatible
Table 1e The increasing specificity, complexity and diversification of search functions based on the type of creativeworks.
Stages of Copyright Action2 Literary Image Audio-Visual
Rights Implicated Storagea (and caching)
Copying
Display
Copying
Adaptation (thumbnails)
Display (inc. in-lining)
Storagea
Copying
Adaptation (screen capturing)
Display
Broadcast
Possible Actions in Infringement Primary Primary Primary (Music/TV)
Secondary (YouTube)
Safe Harbor Protection No No No (Music/TV)
Maybe (YouTube)
Fair Use
Defense
Maybe Likely/Yes (transformative use) Likely/Yes (Music/TV)
(transformative use)
Maybe (YouTube)
(substantial non-infringing
uses; non-inducement)
Private Arrangements Likely/Yes (settlement
agreements in progress)
Not Applicable Yes (special agreements with
some media outlets)
a This practice may be relevant to an inquiry into the likelihood of common law secondary infringement.
4 The term “copyright” can be misleading as the rights per-
taining to it involve much more than mere duplication or copying
(referred to here as “cloning”), and this may account for the
perpetuation of a lack of understanding and a general acceptance
amongst laymen of practices including music sampling and
technological innovations like image in-lining that may techni-
cally infringe other exclusive rights under copyright law.
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technology companies.5 All these developments have grown
the company into a highly lucrative force and have inevitably
given rise to envy and rivalry among its competitors, and to
disputes with the creative industries whose intellectual
property it increasingly ‘transacts’ in rather than merely
‘manages’.
In relation to the second objective, Google has taken on
a more active, some would even say aggressive, role in its
efforts to produce the best search results for its keyword
search services, in terms of comprehensiveness, relevancy
and accuracy, for each of its suite of purpose- and format-
based search engines. For instance, in relation to the Google
Books Search Project (GBS), Google has gone beyond merely
“spidering” and cataloging of materials posted by third parties
to taking active steps to scan hard copies of literary works,
storing them and posting them in various forms and levels of
substantiality. Similarly, in order for the effective and efficient
functioning of the Google Images Search Engine (GIS) and its
Google Video Search Engine (GVS), Google reduces the size of
images appearing on web pages and video stills to thumbnail
sized images and screen captures respectively for search
results display. In relation to the former, it further provides
a framed in-lined full sized image on the browser window
(either in a frame or superimposed over a faded background of
the original webpage), giving users the option of accessing and
viewing the image in or out of its original context. Thus, there
are some distinctions across Google’s search services in terms
of its practices and policies, which is apparent from simple
categorizations like the one in Table 2.
1.3. The creative empire strikes back
One would have thought that as a cataloger providing index-
ing function to organize data on the WWW so as to connect
users to copyright holders’ materials, it would endear Google
to both parties and create a symbiotic relationship between
them. To a large extent, the parties still enjoy a positive
relationship amongst themselves, but conflicts began to arise
and cracks started to form in their relationship as Google’s
expansion of its operations began to encroach on the tradi-
tionally conservative rights of copyright holders, and as their
interests began to diverge and conflict. This tension that
exists between creative works and technology, and between
creators’ rights and technological progress, both of which
are beneficial to society as a whole, has been heightened
over time.6 It is thus inevitable that Google’s expansionist
ambitions would clash with the protectionist tendencies of
creators the more it gets involved in the copying, adaptation
and publication of creative works in such a manner that can
amount to secondary and even primary infringement. In each
of the search functions that Google has launched and operates
today, there have been disputes with copyright holders that
feel that their rights are threatened. This is really part of the
overall distrust that copyrightownershold toward information
and communications technology in general and the digitiza-
tion of communication, products and services in particular;
and the fear of a concomitant loss of control over how their
works are used. Thus, there are a series of cases before the
courts in many jurisdictions between copyright owners as
plaintiffs against Google as a defendant over its practices.
2. The objectives of this paper: the search
for a compromise
The focus of this article is on the legal challenges that Google
faces in two main areas of its operations relating to the
Table 2 e Table of comparison on Google’s role in relation to some of its search functions.
Search Function Poster Google’s Role Copyright Holders’ Options
Text/News Search
Music Search (US only)
Copyright Holder
Third Party
News: Google Aggregator Services Opt-Out
Notice Processa
Settlement Option
Book Search Google Books: Scanning and Storage Opt-Out
Settlement option
Image Search Copyright holder
Third Party
Images: Thumbnails, framing and
in-lining images only
Opt-Out
Notice processa
Music/Video Search
YouTube
Copyright Holder
Third Party
Videos: Screen-Capturing and
Various Forms of Recommendations
Opt-Out
Notice Processa
Settlement Option
a Statutory notice-and-take-down process (the notice process).
5 The “ successful monetization of search” or “consumptive
use”, the interest of content creators in profit sharing and the
distribution of such services as well as the “increasing breadth of
services offered” by the search engine industry would inevitably
lead to a greater volume of disputes. See, Ben Kociubinski, Copy-
right and the Evolving Law of Internet Search e Field v. Google, Inc. and
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 12 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 372, 383e4
(Summer 2006). Google is also selling advertisement space on its
search engine display as its primary form of business.
6 An example of the complex relationship between the two
sides is the ongoing copyright litigation between Viacom and
YouTube, a Google subsidiary. Viacom has used YouTube as
a marketing tool to reach potential consumers while it complains
that the same tool is abused by both Google (as intermediary) and
consumers (as users). This uneasy relationship is further
complicated by the fact that the parties require one another to
survive and perhaps even thrive even while they are in conflict
over the parameters of copyright protection and Internet inter-
mediary protection. In the long term, both sides cannot afford to
totally win or alienate one another with their objectives and
functions. This makes the job of the mediator (i.e. policy and law-
makers) more difficult as a result and the obvious outcome is
some sort of compromise.
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expansion of its search engine functions, with a special focus
on the technological tools that it had developed and is
currently using to improve its information location services.
In Section I of this Part, I will examine the US cases on the
practices and features relating to the effective functioning of
image search engines. In particular the cases by a photogra-
pher against Arriba Soft Corp. (now Ditto.com) and an adult
men’s magazine featuring pictures of women against Google
(and Amazon) provides the initial assessment of the legality of
the technologies and features of image search engines and the
likely trends and attitudes of the US courts and the courts of
other jurisdictions in their application of the law, in particular
the analysis of the fair use defense raised by the defendants.
In Part Two of this paper, I will examine the features of the
Google Books Search Project that sets it apart from Google’s
other information search services (i.e. News, Finance, Scholar
and Blogs). The analyses of the issues surrounding these
operations, the existing state of law and how it has applied to
these functions, and the likely trends of judicial decision-
making or statutory amendment, will be done before
a proposal will be made on the appropriate reallocation of
rights, liability and responsibility to recalibrate the balance of
interests underlying copyright law.7 This will be done in
Section II of the respective Parts of this article.
In Section II of this Part, I will recommend solutions for the
issues relating to the Google Images Search Engine through
a suggested set of legal reform within the existing Internet
intermediaries’ law and copyright framework in relation to
Google’s functions, in amanner thatwill likewise be applicable
to similar functions offered by other Internet intermediaries.
Measures forGoogle to change or improve its practices in order
to seek reconciliation through compromise with copyright
owners will also be suggested.8
These changes in the law and recommended practices can
also be useful for other similar disputes relating to Google’s
myriad roles and functions in relation to its search services
and beyond. The proposed legislative amendments,9 and the
various forms and levels that it can take, as determined by the
importance of the function concerned, can help to resolve the
outstanding issues for Google and also for other Internet
intermediaries including search engines, and technology
companies that offer, create and develop the same or similar
services.10 In the process, the overarching public policy
considerations will also be determined, and Google’s ‘menu’
of search functionswill be assessed as to their importance and
contributions to social good aswell as the challenges that they
pose to the protection of copyright holders’ interests and
copyright law objectives.11
The proposed reforms will involve the following:12
1. Updating the safe harbor provisions to specifically address
and allow for specific roles, functions, operations and
technological tools relating to the search engine where the
overall benefits outweigh the detriment; in particular,
where the social benefits are great and the financial impact
on copyright holders is minimal. Rather than as a right to
protection, alternatively the same or similar provisions can
take the form of specific fair use exemptions as a defense
that will have to be pleaded by the defendant.
2. Updating the non-exhaustive list of fair use factorswith new
and additional factors that take into account the important
differences in treatment that should be accorded to copy-
rightable works in the digital context arising from and
illustrated by the case studies in Parts One and Two;
including the suggestion to statutorily recognize and codify
judge-made tests such as the “transformative use test”, the
“substantial non-infringing uses test” and the “non-induce-
ment test” that emerged from United States Supreme Court
decisions. Transparency through the release of explanatory
notes and transcripts of preparatory works will serve as
useful guidelines on the policies behind the amendments
7 As a proviso, it must be stated at the outset that the focus of
existing and likely state of affairs between the law and Google’s
functions will be on US copyright law and Google’s operations in
the US. It should also be noted that Google may offer different
sets of services in different jurisdictions based on the country-
coded top level domain name (ccTLD) search engine webpage or
the generic top level domain name (gTLD) search engine web-
page; thus services such as its Books and Music search engines
are not available in all jurisdictions, while others such as Web,
Images and Videos search engines are largely available.
8 Although private resolution can be an alternative method of
achieving agreement, it cannot be a satisfactory vehicle for
achieving consensus, as law and policy makers must also ensure
that public interests are not ignored or given short shrift and that
there should be harmonization in treatment vertically (to the
same types of parties) and horizontally (across jurisdictions).
9 Another function that this exercise will achieve is the
recommendation of these factors to other jurisdictions and for it
to be brought before international trade and intellectual property
bodies, in particular the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) with a view to achieving worldwide coherence, and
harmonized advancement, in copyright law.
10 It must be kept in mind that despite the fact that Google and
its activities vis-a`-vis the law is the subject of this paper, the real
focus is on its functions and purposes and that is where the legal
and policy reforms has to be made. Also, it must be noted that
although Google is the main protagonist and subject of this
analysis, much of the analysis here are equally applicable to
Google’s main competitors such as Yahoo! and other online
enterprises or non-profit organizations that have taken on the
same roles or are performing the same functions and operations
as Google. In other words, the recommendations are subject
neutral and apply to any Internet intermediary based on the facts
and circumstances of the case. Hence, some of the solutions that
will be proposed in this paper will be familiar and can relate and
apply where applicable to other disputes such as those between
copyright holders and other technology creators.
11 I.e. optimization of societal benefits for public interest anal-
ysis over and above a rights-liability and benefits-detriment
private interest analysis. The technical and practical benefits of
Google’s search functions are measured against the main objec-
tives of copyright law.
12 As noted before, the suggested legal reforms through statutory
amendments could also apply beyond domestic jurisdictions to
international copyright or trade-related treaties, through such
world bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the
WIPO. At the very least, it is hoped that this paper will provide
consideration for courts and generate academic discussion on the
potential legal solutions to the issues as well as provide some
guidance for Google and other search engines providing similar
services on the strength of their legal position as well as how they
can tailor their activities to place themselves in more favorable
legal footing.
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and for the proper application of these factors, including
their relationship with secondary infringement actions,
which can also be extended to other new technologies.
3. Section I e the Google Images Search
Engine (GIS)
3.1. Brief history of development
Like many Internet intermediaries operating on the WWW
today, Google operates as a conduit between online entities. Its
advertising business model is supplementary to, but reliant on,
its basic functionas a searchengine.Google indexesmaterials in
all forms for thebenefitof Internetuserswhile it sellsadvertising
spaceandservices on itswebpagesonanon-mutually exclusive
basis. It is also at the forefront of the user-generated content
movement, having acquired YouTube and other similar busi-
nesses through the diversification of its portfolio. Google began
its function as an information locator service indexing online
materials irrespective of their nature and form, mainly dealing
with and presenting them in the same way. The benefit of this
function, which was not controversial in its inception, was the
basis for the copyright ‘safe harbor’ provisions under the
domestic law in most countries. As search engines like Google
expand its functionality based on efficiency and efficacy, it is
perhaps inevitablethat itwillcompartmentalize itssearchesand
offer specific servicesbased on thenature of awork and the type
ofmaterial thatauser issearching for.This isusercustomization
e to improve the accuracy of relevant search returns and
consequently the overall customer experience. The aim is to
both retain and expand its user-customer base. Over time, as
both its locator tool and its search algorithms became more
sophisticated, specific and targeted, disputes began to arise; and
oneof theearliest specific formof search launchedand thatgave
rise to copyright dispute was the images search engine.
Image search indexes pre-date Google’s images search
engine. It involves the use of a form of technology that crawls,
indexes, and caches websites on servers to enable quick
access. Upon the entry of keywords and the push of a button,
likely relevant information and images that may be of interest
to the user will be presented based on search algorithms. It is
important to note at the outset that it is logical that image
search results will be presented as images and not merely
descriptively through words or phrases, which is key to the
objections and disputes that arose relating to the images
search function services. Google’s images search service
creates and provides thumbnail or reduced-sized copies of
images that are search by user whomay see them on a results
page. When a user selects an image from a Google search,
a new page is accessed that includes a faded image of the
original website in the background of the full-sized image
superimposed before it as well as Google’s right frame that
contains information about the image including the domain
name of the website wherein it is found, and links to the full-
sized image in a separate browser and to the website con-
taining the image in its full context. Clicking on the super-
imposed image or full-sized image link will produce
a webpage containing only the full-sized image as it appears
on the source page, while clicking on the domain name or the
faded background will bring the user to the website proper.13
This form of gathering and cataloging of online informa-
tion is ‘content-neutral’ and ‘source indifferent’. This is
important to note as they involve issues of control and
complicity that relates to immunity and culpability respec-
tively. For instance, the websites crawled and presented
includes many third-party websites that contains copyright
infringing images.
3.1.1. The opt-out feature
The opt-out feature is in full effect here and will be the
common thread throughout all the search functions relating
to different forms of content. The automatic process involved
in producing searchable images is based on an automatic and
presumptive opt-in of all images available on the WWW.
Image owners can opt-out by demanding that images uploa-
ded without their permission be taken down by giving notice
through the statutory notice process.
3.2. The issues
The first significant case addressing the legality of image
searches utilizing modified and extracted copies of images
uploaded by third parties did not involve Google but rather an
early images search engine known as Arriba Soft Corp. (now
Ditto.com),but it isnevertheless instructive forall searchengines
including Google on the legal status of such a service. In fact, it
was thatcase thatfirstexpandedthe fairuse factordefenseto the
online context. Before going into the substance of the seminal
cases, it will be useful to first identify the issues and the main
practices in contention, as the result of the cases as well as the
proposed solution will depend on the type of use in question.
3.2.1. First issue: the production and display of thumbnail or
reduced-sized images for search results e likely fair use
A ‘thumbnail’ is a reduced-size version of a full-sized image
that allows users to quickly find visual information on
a search engine and allows more images to be presented in
a results page for a streamlined and a quicker and easier
selection process. Google has modified the images search
results page since the cases, but the basic format, presenta-
tions and functions remain the same. Currently, thumbnail
images pops-out and the thumbnail images on a particular
subject are presented in scroll-down form in a single search
results page. The format for other search engines such as
Yahoo! remains closer to the original Google architecture.
It is to be noted that the main difference with information
search is that, unlike the use of part of online information
13 Google’s Images Search Results interface is not consistent. In
some cases, it only displays the image against a white back-
ground with a row of images responding to the similar keyword
search displayed under it and with a right bar containing infor-
mation on and hyperlink to the image. However, the manner of
display is largely substantively similar and gives rise to the same
issues. Previously, Google produces image results in a top frame
with the relevant information on the image and links, with the
actual website shown under that frame. It is to be noted that
Google does place a warning that “[the] Image may be subject to
copyright” with every search result.
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without changes in its presentation, computer modifications or
adaptations are made to the entire image in the process of
streamlining the image search results process so as to better
present or display it for selection from a single page (i.e. more
search results on one page). However, these dissimilarities
may not so different if looked at from a different perspective,
for one can also consider the excerpting of results from
information websites as a form of adaptation of a work; it is
even more similar if the caching function, which has been
adjudged to be legal in Field v. Google, Inc.,14 is taken into
consideration. Be that as it may, the mere modification of
image content removes it from the statutory safe harbor as
will be explained below and hence the legality of its creation
and use remains the subject of a fair use analysis.
3.2.2. Second issue: inline linking to full-sized images in
a separate browser window e unresolved
Google’s images search engine also provides an intermediate
view between the results page and the actual webpage. It
currently operates in substantially similar form from its
original top frame to the current right frame format. This page
frames the original webpage and provides a further choice for
users to visit a browser window containing only the image, or
to go to the image in context, that is the original webpage that
can be a main page or an inner page through a process known
as deep-linking. Originally, as part of the process by which it
provides results to image searchers, Google presented a top
framed page containing the thumbnail, information and
domain name hyperlink, the larger bottom half of which
shows part of the third party website on which the image is
found. In one of themore current designs, the click-on images
search results presents an interim or holding page with the
full-sized image superimposed over a faded background of
the original webpage, as opposed to presenting a thumbnail in
the frame itself, with a right frame containing the usual
information and links relating to the image.
An inline link essentially pulls materials such as an image
from the original website onto the webpage viewed. Techni-
cally, it remains on the original website and is not copied,15
but practically it appears otherwise and there can be confu-
sion or ignorance of origin by the average user.
3.2.3. Third issue: linking to third party websites containing
and using images that infringes another’s copyright e likely
safe harbor
The specter of secondary liability was also brought up in
relation to linking to infringing websites through the images
that are contained therein. This was an additional cause of
action that was brought into play in the Perfect 10 case to be
analyzed below, but which remains unresolved by the courts.
However, an assessment can be made of the likelihood of
success on either the vicarious or contributory bases of action
as well as the applicable reach of the safe harbor immunity
under the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA),16 given that it does concern the search engine as an
Internet intermediary, dealingwith third partymaterial. It will
also be assessed as to whether and to what extent the
immunity should apply and what internal checks and
balances such as the notice process that should be imple-
mented by Google and the form that it should take.
3.3. Safe harbor and the DMCA
The DMCA defines an Online Service Provider (OSP) as “a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator
of facilities therefor,”17 which can be interpreted expansively
to encompass services hosting or distributing third-party
content. Eligibility for safe harbor hinges on the fulfillment of
two conditions or threshold requirements e namely that the
OSP: “(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and
informs subscribers and account holders of the service
provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and
account holders of the service provider’s system or network
who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not
interfere with standard technical measures”.18
The DMCA provides four safe harbor categories that can
shield a provider from liability for copyright infringement.
They are categorized based on function and are for “transitory
digital network communications”, “system caching”, “infor-
mation residing on systems or networks at the direction of
users”, and “information location tools”.19 Before the safe
harbor protections are required, the plaintiff copyright owner
14 In Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), the
plaintiff, Field, argued that the defendant Google infringed his
exclusive right to reproduce his copyrighted works when it
cached his website and made a copy of it available on its search
engine. Google raised multiple defenses including the doctrines
of implied license, fair use and estoppel as well as eligibility for
statutory protection under the United States’ Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) safe harbor provi-
sions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The court
found in favor of the defendant and granted the motion for
summary judgment in Google’s favor.
15 Google does not store or physically transmit the full images,
only the thumbnails. However, it provides a holding page with
information on the source of the image and the option to visit the
image in its context on the webpage or the extract of the full
image itself in a separate browser window. This will become the
basis for a divergence in tests used by the United States Circuit
Courts to determine Google’s liability - the “server test” and the
“incorporation test”.
16 17 U.S.C. x512.
17 17 U.S.C. x512(k)(1)(B). Courts have found that an OSP’s capacity
to terminate user accounts or disable access to infringing material
doesnotdisqualify theOSP fromsafeharborunder x512(c)(1)(B). See,
e.g.,Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc.,165F. Supp. 2d1082, 1094 (C.D.Cal. 2001)
(stressing thatOSPsdonot lose safeharbor byengaging in voluntary
practices to reduce infringing activity). See also, Perfect 10, Inc. v.
CCBill, LLC, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12508 (9th Cir.) (noting that
reasonable implementationdoesnot requireanOSP toaffirmatively
police its users for evidence of repeat infringement).
18 17 U.S.C. x512(i)(1)(A)(B). Methods used to identify and protect
copyrighted materials.
19 17 U.S.C. x512(a-d).
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must give proper notice that the service provider in question is
hosting infringing content.20
The image search engine’s re-creation and use of thumb-
nails as well as the framing, inline linking and deep linking for
display removes it from the safety berth of section 512(a) as
a “transitory digital network communications” service
provider because the material is not transmitted without
modification of content.21 Section 512(d) for service providers
of “information location tools” only covers image search
engines from secondary infringement liability for the act of
referring or linking users to such materials online if all the
pre-requites are met; that is, there is no legal knowledge or
awareness, no direct financial benefit and an adherence to the
notice process.22 Hence themere technical act of cataloging all
content on the WWW irrespective of source and providing
links between users and posters irrespective of the legitimacy
or legality of the postings is protected and the third issue is
likely to be resolved at this stage. Because of the nature of the
first two issues, which relates to Google’s own actions in
relation to images, the safe harbor protection does not apply
and it has to seek respite under current exceptions or
exemptions from primary infringement.
3.4. Fair use and the cases
3.4.1. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation23
Kelly v. Arriba is often cited as the authority relating to the
legality of the functions of image search engines in relation to
third party images. In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the
re-creation and use of thumbnails of copyrighted images that
are made available on the WWW by third parties, whether or
not copyright holders or licensees, by an image search engine
to be presented in its results page and triggered by a keyword
search, constituted fair use.24
According to the court, while these thumbnail images also
serve an Aesthetic purpose, their use by search engines for
presentation in an image search results page was “trans-
formative” in the context of the first fair use factor,25 which
thereby affected the treatment and weight of the other factors
as well.26 It was transformative in this context as its use
improved users’ access to images on the Internet. This appli-
cation of the transformative use test is an expansion of its
original formulation by the US Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose.27 The fair use test is likely to be successful if
a ‘transformed work’ leads to a socially productive outcome
and different or value-added function from the original.
In summary on the thumbnail issue, the Ninth Circuit
found in favor of Arriba based on the following assessment
and weight of the four main factors in the fair use analysis,
which overall weighed in favor of the defendant:
1. Purpose and character of the use e The use was found to be
transformative albeit commercial in that it was not of the
20 17 U.S.C. x512(c)(3). Whether or not Google and Amazon
deserve these protections will depend on how strictly the court
require the parties to comply with the technical definitions in the
Act. See, Eric Carnevale, Questions of Copyright in Google’s Image
Search: Developments in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 14 B.U. J.
Sci. & Tech. L. 132, 141e142 (Winter 2008), on the potential
applicability of the DMCA safe harbor provisions to Google and
Amazon.
21 17 U.S.C. x 512(a)(5).
22 17 U.S.C. x 512(d).
23 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). To be known as “Kelly v. Arriba”.
24 The plaintiff Kelly sold pictures to various publications from
his website. The defendants Arriba ran an image search engine
that indexed pictures from the WWW for users to conduct image
searches. The search engine reduces the size of images of all
dimensions into thumbnail sized images that matches the
keyword term. Kelly’s pictures appeared as thumbnails on the
defendants’ search engine along with millions of other thumbnail
images from all over the WWW. Clicking on the thumbnails from
Kelly’s website would connect the user to the webpage in Kelly’s
website containing the image, but bypasses the home page (i.e.
deep linking). Just like how Google functions, the user who clicks
on a thumbnail is brought to an intermediate framed page where
he is also given the option of going to only the full image in a new
web browser window as well as in the context of the original
webpage. The thumbnail image was stored on Arriba’s servers
whereas the full image was not replicated. Kelly sued Arriba for
copyright infringement for both the re-creation and use of the
thumbnail image and the full image. In a summary judgment, the
lower court judge found for the search engine operator based on
a finding of fair use (77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999)), a deci-
sion that was upheld on appeal, holding that thumbnails were
prima facie infringing, but that the fair use doctrine permitted the
use of the thumbnails by image search engines in an index and
within their search results. However, the Circuit Court over-
turned the lower court’s decision on the issue of inline linking to
the full-sized images out of context, holding that fair use did not
permit the inline linking or framing processes that displayed
Kelly’s images in the context of Arriba’s website. On 7 July 2003, it
modified its initial decision by letting the ruling on thumbnails
stand but withdrawing its decision on inline links and remanded
the case to the District Court for trial, holding that the lower had
made a decision it should not have made at that stage of the
proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that a search engine
operator’s use of images as thumbnails without seeking prior
permission constituted fair use (280 F.3d 934 (CA9 2002) with-
drawn, re-filed at 336 F.3d 811 (CA9 2003). The issue of inline
linking of full-sized images remained unresolved at this point.
25 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) at 818. The
“purpose and character of the use”, which considers the social
value of the secondary usage, taking into consideration whether
the use is commercial or for a non-profit educational purpose,
and whether there is mere duplication or involves some modifi-
cation (i.e. transformation) imbuing the work with new meaning,
message or expression. See, 17 U.S.C. x107.
26 Although the commercial aspect of the defendant’s use will
weigh against a finding of fair use, whereas a finding of non-profit
and educational purpose tends to support a claim for fair use,
neither is conclusive or precludes a finding otherwise and a lot
depends on the cumulative effect and weight of all the relevant
factors.
27 Luther R. Campbell AKA Luke Skywalker v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510
US 569 (1994). To be known as “Campbell v. Acuff-Rose”. In this
case, the US Supreme Court held that while transformative use is
not essential for a finding of fair use, the purpose of copyright is
advanced by the use of transformative works. The Court stated
that: “Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”
Furthermore, the more transformative the new work, the less
significant are the other factors (as they are neither mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive) in terms of relevance and weight, such
as the market effect for the copyrighted work (ibid. at 579).
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same type as the original work, because the images were
not being sold as pictures but were to facilitate the
presentation and identification of images by the search
engine. Thus, the first factor weighed in Arriba’s favor due
to the public benefit of the image search engine and the
minimal loss of integrity to Kelly’s images.
2. Nature of the copyrightedworkeThepictureswere creative
workpublishedandmadeavailableon theWWW.Acreative
work favors a findingof infringement, althoughas apublicly
accessiblepublishedwork, theusewasmore likely to be fair.
As such, this factor weighed only slightly in favor of Kelly.
3. Amount and substantiality of portion used e Copying an
entire work generally militates against a finding of fair use;
however, itwasnecessary forArriba tocopytheentire image
to allow users to recognize the image and decidewhether to
pursue more information from source. The court therefore
found this factor to be neutral in this context.
4. Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work e Once again, the effects of the
transformative doctrine infected the court’s assessment of
a fair use factor. Here, it was found that a transformative
work was less likely to have an adverse effect than one that
merely supersedes the original. Also, Arriba’s use of Kelly’s
images in its thumbnails did not harm the market for Kel-
ly’s images or the value of his images as they would direct
traffic to Kelly’s website and work rather than away from it
and the size of the thumbnails made using them in lieu of
the original image less likely among his target clientele.
This factor thus weighed in favor of the defendant.
After some confusing about-turns on the issue of framing
and inline linking and whether it constitutes copyright
infringement of the public display right for search engines to
utilize those techniques for its operations,28 the matter
remained unresolved at this stage.29 As this technique of oper-
ation is commonlyusedbymanyother Internet search engines,
including major players like Google, Yahoo!, Lycos, and Alta-
vista, a conclusion otherwise can affect the facilitative uses of
these applications and techniques for the efficient navigation
of the WWW. The Ninth Circuit later revisited the question of
whether inline linking infringes the public display right in the
Perfect 10 case, to be analyzed below, involving Google’s images
search function, where the court ultimately determined that
inline linking to images without prior expressed approval does
not violate the public display right under copyright law.
3.4.2. Perfect 10 v. Google and Perfect 10 v. Amazon30
It would seem that the arguments in the Kelly v. Arriba case
would apply favorably to Google in the subsequent case
brought against itself and Amazon by Perfect 10 on the same
functions and within the same Circuit.31 However, although
the transformative use test was accepted as applicable, the
identity and specific use of the image by the poster and the
potential market value in thumbnail images for Perfect 10,
unlike the case for Kelly in the earlier case, shows how the
application of the same fair use doctrine could give rise to
a different reading and weighing of the factors to tip the
balance in favor of a finding against fair use and copyright
infringement. Indeed, the initial district court decision in this
case illustrates how this fact-based approach of the fair use
28 On Arriba’s use of inline linking and framing, the Ninth Circuit
originally held that prima facie, this constituted a violation of
Kelly’s right to public display. The Ninth Circuit also considered
whether Arriba could avail itself of the fair use defense, and held
that it could not. Thus, Arriba was liable for directly infringing
Kelly’s copyright by inline linking and framing to the full-sized
images. On the initial ruling (Kelly I ), which went against Arriba,
see Matthew C. Staples, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 18 Berkeley Tech. L.
J. 69, 77e79 (2003). Assessing Arriba’s inline linking and framing
practices, the court noted that Arriba had made no copies and
hence did not infringement Kelly’s duplication rights, it thus
analyzed the case based on the public display right (ibid. at 78).
Unlike the thumbnail images, the search engine could function
the same (and arguable even better) without the framing and in-
lining of full-sized images as they were not necessary as a means
to access other information on the WWW beyond what the
thumbnails already provide (i.e. no new expression or meaning
for “transformative use”) but were an end product themselves
(ibid. at 79). All four statutory fair use factors thus weighed in
favor of Kelly and the court held that Arriba’s inline linking and
framing of Kelly’s full-sized images did not constitute fair use.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued a revised ruling (Kelly II), in
which it withdrew the portion of the opinion dealing with inline
linking and the public display right of the full-sized images over
a year after the Kelly I decision was issued. This was due to
procedural reasons, on the ground that the court should not have
decided on this issue since the parties did not move for summary
judgment as to copyright infringement of the full-sized images. In
Kelly II, the court affirmed that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images as
thumbnails was a fair use. The court in Kelly II declined to address
whether inline linking and framing of the full-sized images
constituted direct infringement. Secondary infringement issues
were not discussed in the Kelly v. Arriba litigation. Subsequently,
in the Perfect 10 case, the Ninth Circuit again revisited the matter
and decided that inline linking to images did not infringe the
public display right of image copyright holders.
29 See further, Adam B. Olson,Why Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.
3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003), Does and Doesn’t Matter, 44 Jurimetrics J. 487
(Summer 2004). Neither party had requested summary judgment
regarding Arriba’s use of Kelly’s full-size images nor had Kelly
conceded it as a “display” and hence a prima facie case of copy-
right infringement. The court remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with the substituted
opinion. As noted previously, the substitute opinion negated the
appellate court’s initial ruling that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s full-
sized images infringed Kelly’s copyrights.
30 To be known collectively as the “Perfect 10 case”.
31 This line of cases must be put in context as being of prece-
dential value only in the Ninth Circuit although it does have
persuasive effect elsewhere in the United States and even in
other countries.
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assessment can give rise to conflicting cases and expectations
of images search engine practices. In the district court deci-
sion in Perfect 10 v. Google,32 Google was sued for direct
infringement for framing websites that contained Perfect 10’s
images without its authority and for Google’s modification
and re-creation of its images as thumbnails.33 The plaintiff
also sued for secondary infringement for framing infringing
websites, but was not able to prove all the elements of
contributory or vicarious infringement.34
On the thumbnail practice, the four factors were again
applied by the district court to the facts but in a manner that
diverged in results from Kelly v. Arriba and raised a cause for
concern to images search engine operators. It found for the
plaintiff based on the following assessment:
1. Purpose and character of the use e The use was found to be
commercial and partially transformative; that is, it was
intended to serve a fundamentally different purpose than the
original. The court found Google’s use highly commercial,
more so than inKelly v.Arriba, duemainly toGoogle’sAdSense
program,which a number of the infringing sites used. Also, in
contrast to the earlier case, the court noted that Perfect 10 also
has a commercial interest in theuse of thumbnail images as it
leased the right to distribute reduced-size versions of its
images for use on cell phones to another company, Fonestarz
Media Limited, thereby putting it in direct competition with
Google’s thumbnails.Therefore, thecourtruledthat thisfactor
weighed slightly in favor of the plaintiff.
2. Nature of the copyrighted work e Creative works are given
more protection against fair use than factual works, and
unpublished works more than published works. The court
rejected Google’s argument that the images were not
creative, but it acknowledged that the works were all pub-
lished, and as such it ruled that this factor also weighed in
favor of Perfect 10 but only slightly.
3. Amount and substantiality of portion usede Comparing the
substantiality of the use to Google’s need to use reduce-sized
versions of entire images to serve its purpose of allowing
identification, which it could not do as effectively if it had to
crop images, this factorwasweighed infavorofneitherparty.
4. Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work e As noted above, the plaintiff had
begun marketing images for cell phones of comparable
quality to Google’s images. Thus, the court ruled that
Google’s infringement meant that this could greatly hurt
Perfect 10’s market and the value of its work when it could
be downloaded and copied for free from Google’s version.
Thus this factor weighed against Google.
As a result, on the fair use issue, the court determined
that cumulatively, the first, second, and fourth fair use
factors weigh slightly in favor of the plaintiff while the third
remained neutral. All things considered, the court concluded
that Google’s actions vis-a`-vis Perfect 10’s images did not fall
within the fair use exception and awarded Perfect 10
injunctive relief against Google’s use of its thumbnail. The
Court reached this conclusion despite the enormous benefits
that search engines such as Google provide,35 and how this
uncertainty in results could affect images search format and
operations in general.
The Perfect 10 case illustrates how the factors test could be
applied differentially to diverse fact situations and circum-
stances, especially when significance is placed on the identity,
practices and purpose of the copyright holder of images.36
32 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
The district court granted the request in part and denied it in part,
ruling that the thumbnails were likely to be found infringing but
the links were not. See, Ben Kociubinski, Copyright and the Evolving
Law of Internet Search e Field v. Google, Inc. and Perfect 10 v. Google,
Inc., 12 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 372 (Summer 2006), where the writer
wrote of the implications of the Field v. Google and Perfect 10 cases
and also noted that another district court in Pennsylvania
involving the issue of caching and indexing copyrighted material
in the WWW has since followed Field v. Google and granted
summary judgment to Google (ibid. at 383).
33 The case involved a dispute between an adult men’s magazine
as plaintiff and Google as defendant. The plaintiff requested
a preliminary injunction for Google to stop it from creating and
distributing its thumbnail images in, and to stop indexing and
linking to sites illegally hosting, such images on Google’s image
search service. Perfect 10 sold a men’s magazine that featured
sexually provocative images of women and also operated a web-
site featuring such images and a business of leasing some of
these images to other businesses. It filed a case against Google
making various copyright and trademark infringement claims,
including primary or direct infringement and secondary
(contributory and vicarious) infringement of copyright. After
failed settlement talks, the case proceeded to court. Following the
district court’s decision, both sides cross-appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the lower court decision.
34 Google did not secondarily infringe on Perfect 10’s rights as
the infringing websites were independently existing irrespective
of Google’s framing practices even if it may have obtained direct
financial benefits from advertising revenue tied to the framing
practice. On this cause of action with respect to the issue of
hyperlinks, Google also raised the safe harbor defense that
Perfect 10 contested. However, the court did not reach an opinion
on the matter as it found that Perfect 10 was unlikely to succeed
on the matters of contributory and vicarious liability because of
other arguments.
35 Although the Court was reluctant to issue a ruling that it felt
would impede the advance of Internet technology and the public
benefits it provides, it felt that it could not allow such consider-
ations to trump a reasoned analysis of the four fair use factors.
This shows the importance of and priority that should be accor-
ded to the expressed list of factors despite the flexibility of
allotting weight and that they are non-exhaustive.
36 See also, Adam B. Olson, Why Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811 (9th Cir. 2003), Does and Doesn’t Matter, 44 Jurimetrics J. 487
(Summer 2004), where writer pointed out that the court’s lack of
clarity regarding the scope of its holding makes it difficult to
determine the bounds of fair use as applied to the creation and
use of thumbnails. If narrowly construed a thumbnail is a fair use
only if the original image is an esthetic work and it is used solely
for indexing purposes; but if broadly construed, all thumbnails
may be considered fair uses because they are transformations of
the original images.
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This could have severe implications on image search engines
that are fully automated in all cases, and that do not distin-
guish based on source, objectives and the profile of image
uploaders. To require such screening and pre-judgment of
WWW images will be a highly onerous and burdensome
process for search service providers.
In relation to the framing issue, the district court found
that the relevant question of whether Google was guilty of
displaying and distributing the full-sized images due to its
framing of third party content was whether it hosted and
physically transmitted the content itself (the “server test”).37 It
rejected Perfect 10’s argument that the relevant question
should be whether the content is visually incorporated into
the site (the “incorporation test”).38 Since on the physical
level, Google only provided an instruction for the user’s
computer to fetch the infringing pages from servers not under
its control, the court found that Perfect 10 was unlikely to
succeed on this point, and so denied its request for an
injunction.39
However, the district court’s decision that the Google
images search’s thumbnail practice was infringing was
overturned by the Ninth Circuit,40 which ruled on a balance of
interests that its use was “highly transformative”,41 because
Google transformed the images from a use of entertainment
and artistic expression to one of facilitating the retrieval of
information including images from the Internet.42 The court
thus raised the bar for unfair use of images as thumbnails in
37 The court gave several reasons for its adoption of the “server
test”, inter alia, that the test is consistent with how content travels
over the Internet. The court also reasoned that the test is liability
“neutral”, meaning that the test does not invite infringing activ-
ities by search engines, but search engines may still be liable for
secondary infringement (i.e. contributory or vicarious liability).
Also, the court was of the view that the “server test” would
maintain the delicate balance which copyright law strives, which
is to promote the creation of creative works and encourage the
dissemination of information. Most importantly, the court was
reluctant to adopt the “incorporation test” as it “would cause
a tremendous chilling effect on the core functionality of the web
e its capacity to link, a vital feature of the internet that makes it
accessible, creative and valuable.” See, Nimmer on Copyright x
12B. 01[A][2] (2005) cited by Perfect 10 v. Google Inc. 416 F. Supp. 2d
828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) at 840.
38 This may have an impact on the question of whether a framed
work or composition of websites is a derivative work, which was
first broached in Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., et al.,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 2005. See, Hillel I. Parness, Framing the
Question: How Does Kelly v. Arriba Soft Advance the Framing Debate?,
Vol. 7, No. 1 p. 9 (Cyberspace Lawyer, March 2002), noting that
arguing framing as infringement of the right to create an adap-
tation may not be logical, practicable or even necessary when
other exclusive rights such as reproduction or display could be
used instead.
39 Google was not found liable for secondary infringement,
either contributory or vicarious. In light of this, the district court
thought it unnecessary to deal the issues regarding safe harbor
immunity under the DMCA.
40 In 2007, the Ninth Circuit made three decisions based on
Perfect 10’s lawsuit on the basis of copyright infringement
against various Internet intermediaries in its bid to stop alleged
unauthorized downloading of its images from the WWW. First
was Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007),
which was a consolidated case against both Google and Amazon
involving Perfect 10’s request for a preliminary injunction that
Google directly and indirectly infringed its copyrights by thumb-
nailing its images and facilitating its display on users’ computer
screens, and providing access to full sized versions of the
infringing images drawn from the original website within its
frames (ibid. at 1155e57). Second, in Perfect 10 v. Visa International
Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007), Perfect 10 argued that
financial institutions that process credit card payments to web-
sites that allegedly profited by selling unauthorized copies of its
copyrighted images had committed contributory and vicarious
infringement of its copyright infringement (ibid. at 793). Third, in
Perfect 10 v. CCBill Inc., 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007), Perfect 10
sought to impose liability for, among other things, the defen-
dant’s provision of web hosting and related Internet connectivity
services to the owners of infringing websites. The Ninth Circuit
dealt with aspects of the safe harbor and notice provisions con-
tained in the DMCA in this decision (ibid. at 1102). See, Robert A.
McFarlane, The Ninth Circuit Lands a “Perfect 10” Applying Copyright
Law to the Internet, 38 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 381 (Spring 2008), for
an introduction to the trifecta of cases. See also, Ryan M.
Rodenberg, Bryan V. Swatt and Pamela C. Laucella, Perfect 10 v.
Visa, Mastercard, et al.: A Full Frontal Assault on Copyright
Enforcement in Digital Media or a Slippery Slope Diverted?, 8
Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 85 (Fall 2008); James M. Tilly, Perfect 10 v.
Visa: The Future of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 61 Okla. L.
Rev. 865 (Winter 2008) and David Haskel, A Good Value Chain Gone
Bad: Indirect Copyright Liability in Perfect 10 v. Visa, 23 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 405 (2008), for criticisms on the case as against the interests of
copyright holders. For an archive of materials on the case, see the
Electronic Frontiers Foundation website at: http://www.eff.org/
cases/perfect-10-v-google.
41 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007) at
1165. “We conclude that the significantly transformative nature
of Google’s search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit,
outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of the
thumbnails in this case.” (ibid. at 1166). In reversing the district
court’s finding that Google’s thumbnails supersedes Perfect 10’s
area of business in licensing the sale of smaller size images, the
Ninth Circuit opined that since the district court did not make
a finding that Google users have downloaded thumbnail images
for cell phone use, the potential harm to Perfect 10’s market was
merely hypothetical, while the transformative nature of Google’s
use was more significant than any incidental superseding use or
the minor commercial aspects of Google’s search engine and
website.
42 Citing Kelly v. Arriba. As content on the WWW continues to
expand, this argument on the importance of cataloging and the
sensitivity and accuracy of relevant information retrieval devices
and technologies can only become even more compelling over
time.
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search engines,43 although it did not rule the possibility out
totally in circumstances that may render a reading of the tea
leaves of fair use factors in favor of the copyright holder. But
given the facts of this decision, it will be quite difficult to
determine what could be the case.44 The Federal Court of
Appeal in this case rendered the cases more consistent once
again within the Ninth Circuit.45 However, the lower court
decision, and the fact that the weight of the fair use factors
were fact-based and varied according to different fact
circumstances, although finally determinatively resolved by
the transformative use test, nonetheless illustrates the
dangers of potential judicial divergence in future United
States court decisions as well as the application of the fair use
test or its equivalent and in other jurisdictions that may not
adopt the same approach to the matter.46
As noted, “transformative use” as a doctrine also has
a significant impact on the factors test and analysis and it can,
often adversely, impact on the weight of the other factors
transcending its role in thefirst factor analysis. The stronger the
“transformative effect as determined by the court, the less
significant the other factors relative to it.47 It permeates and
‘infects’ all the other factors in the analysis and thus seems to
supplant them in importance.48 This makes the factors assess-
ment even more flexible, which also means that it is more
subjective. It also makes the adoption of the test integral to the
survival of the image search engine function in other
jurisdictions.
Although the lower court’s decision was reversed and
superseded by a subsequent opinion by the Federal Court of
Appeal that is more consistent with Kelly v. Arriba;49 the
potential for differential treatment and confusion remains as
the issue have only been dealt with in the Ninth Circuit and
have yet to be considered in other Circuit Courts, and there is
no authoritative pronouncement by the United States
Supreme Court on whether the transformative use test is
43 “Future courts are likely to overvalue the transformative
nature of search engines and undervalue the legitimate rights of
the copyright holder. When analyzing fair use, the Kelly holding
illustrates how courts may fail to consider any other factors
beyond transformative use”. Sara Ayazi, Search Engines Score
Another Perfect 10: The Continued Misuse of Copyrighted Images on the
Internet, 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 367 (Spring 2006), criticizing the
expansion and application of the transformative use test and
endorsing the district court’s approach in the Perfect 10 case as
a clawback of the search engine’s privileges.
44 Based on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, plaintiffs in the future
may increase the strength of the superseding argument and
downplay the transformative factor by providing actual evidence
of superseding use.
45 Robert A. McFarlane, The Ninth Circuit Lands a “Perfect 10”
Applying Copyright Law to the Internet, 38 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 381
(Spring 2008), on the Perfect 10 trilogy of cases. In particular, it
noted that Perfect 10 v. Amazon narrowed liability for direct
infringement by determining that there was no unauthorized
copying in inline linking based on the “server test” and from
thumbnail of images through the fair use defense or for indirect
infringement as there was no control for vicarious infringement
to occur and only specific knowledge and failure to take simple
preventative measures would give rise to contributory infringe-
ment (ibid. at 404e5).
46 In the Perfect 10 case, the Ninth Circuit court acknowledged
the “case-specific analysis of fair use”, albeit “in light of the
purposes of copyright”. See, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2007) at 1165e6.
47 E.g. vis-a`-vis commercialism. “We note the importance of
analyzing fair use flexibly in light of new circumstances. Sony
Corporation of America et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) at 431e32; ibid. at 448 n. 31 (“‘[Section 107]
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine
of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in
the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp. 65e66 (1976), U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 5680). We are also mindful
of the Supreme Court’s direction that “the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.” (ibid. at 1166). Also,
consider its relationship vis-a`-vis substantiality of use in this
context.
48 Transformative use started gaining popularity after the land-
mark decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. In essence, trans-
formation, or purposeful use of an original work, adding value to
the existing work in creating something new, was the sine qua non
of fair use”. See, Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The
"Transformative" Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 1, 6
(2002). However, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose fell
short of providing lower courts a fully developed structure of
analysis for later cases. This has resulted in inconsistencies in the
application of the transformative doctrine. In particular, as sug-
gested, courts in some cases tend to focus too much on the
transformative factor, to the extent that it has almost become
“proxy for the fair use determination itself” (ibid. at 24).
49 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007),
available at: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/
2007/12/03/0655405.pdf. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision on appeal on its fair use and contributory
infringement findings and vacated the preliminary injunction
regarding Google’s use of thumbnail images. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit dealt with the issues in relation to both Google and
Amazon. Amazonwas implicated as it gave users access anduse in
its site to Google search results, framed via inline links (by which
the Amazon user received the same search result as the Google
user). The suit was for both primary and secondary infringement.
On 22 February 2010, it was reported that Perfect 10 have settled
the suit with Amazon but not with Google on the outstanding case
on contributory copyright infringement. See, Edvard Pettersson,
Amazon.com, Perfect 10 Settle Suit Over Nude Pictures (Bloomberg
Businessweek, 22 February 2010), available at: http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2010-02-22/amazon-com-perfect-10-set
tle-suit-over-nude-pictures-update1-.html. See also, the earlier
(pre-amended) opinion, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d
701 (9th Cir 2007). Perfect 10 has a track record of suing Internet
intermediaries on several grounds rather than primary infringers.
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir.
2007), where Perfect 10 sued the financial institutions which
process credit card payments to stolen-content websites. See
further SAIF v. Google France and Google Inc., TGI Paris (20 May 2008),
available at: www.legalis.net and Alain Strowel and Vicky Hanley,
Secondary liability for copyright infringement with Regard to hyperlinks
in Alain Strowel (ed.), Peer-To-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability
in Copyright Law (PEFC 2009) at 103e4, on a case similar to the
Perfect 10 case brought by a collective society (SAIF) representing
well-known French photographers against Google before the
French courts for the use of thumbnails and offering links to illicit
reproductions of photographs through its image search engine.
The case was similarly decided in favor of Google on the direct
infringement issue relating to thumbnails; but it did not address
the issue of indirect copyright liability for linking to illegal content.
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applicable in this context or guidance on when and how
images search engines are legitimate. There is also still the
potential that a fact situation can give rise to a finding that
there is lack of fair use when it comes to the current images
search engine practices even if the possibility is remote.
On the second issue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision that Google’s framing, hyper linking, inline
linking and even deep linking practices as part of an images
search engine service were not infringing acts. The entire
search engine business model appears to have the same
transformative effect.50
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court’s
decision on secondary contributory infringement,51 holding
that Google was potentially liable on a theory of contributory
infringement for infringing plaintiff’s copyrights as a result of
its provision of such inline links.52
Some academics have argued that Kelly v. Arriba and
subsequent cases have misapplied and over-extended the
transformative use test via the first factor analysis.53 This
writer argues otherwise; that the transformative use test
was useful, but because of the pandora’s box that can give
rise to differences in its application, the formulation of
a general legislative protection, specific exemption or at
least clearer and more comprehensive fair use factors to
render a consistent legal and factually-neutral application is
the best solution. Google should not be required to screen or
make initial assessments of the legitimacy of its source of
images or to act in a pseudo-legal decision-making capacity
at any stage of its operations. The outcome of the Kelly v.
Arriba decision and the Perfect 10 opinions seem to bear this
out. Although the position, at least in the Ninth Circuit
appears to be more consistent now, again it must be reit-
erated that the outcome is unclear for future cases, espe-
cially with such a fact-based analysis.
3.5. Other developments and issues
3.5.1. Google Videos Search Engine (GVS) and YouTube
A form of search that Google offers online as the materials on
the WWW expanded beyond texts and still images, is the
search for videos and, in the United States at least, music files.
Google Videos is a free video search engine and sharing
website.54 It operates similar to YouTube in some of its func-
tions such as allowing some videos to be embedded on other
websites, making them appear as part of that website, by
50 For the purpose of direct infringement, the Ninth Circuit
endorsed the “server test” applied by the district court. Under this
test, a party infringes the display rights of a copyright holder in
an image when it stores a copy of that image on its own server,
and delivers it to a third party. When an intermediate party
merely provides a link to a third party website where such
infringing material can be found, it is that third party website,
and not the intermediary providing the link, that directly
infringes the display rights of the copyright holder by causing
that infringing image to be displayed on a user’s computer
screen. Applying this test, Google did not directly infringe by
providing inline links to third party websites that themselves
contained infringing images. This is a very technical application
of the law and does not consider the spirit and effects of framing
and in-lining or the real value of framing and inline linking to
a picture out of context vis-a`-vis the rights of copyright holders.
51 According to the Court, Google could be held contributorily
liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 copyrighted
images were available using its search engine and could have but
failed to take simple measures to prevent further damage to its
works. Issues of fact as to the adequacy of notices sent by Perfect
10 alerting Google that it was in fact providing links to third party
websites containing infringing images and Google’s response and
ability to remove such infringing websites from its search results
were referred back to the District Court to resolve on remand. The
district court was also tasked to consider whether the DMCA
immunized Google from liability for such contributory infringe-
ment, an issue that it did not address earlier when it had wrongly
determined that Google was not likely to be found liable for
contributory infringement. However, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that there was no likelihood of vicarious infringement due to
a lack of control over independent third party infringement. See
further, Jason Schultz, P10 v. Google: Public Interest Prevails in Digital
Copyright Showdown (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 16 May 2007),
available at: http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/05/p10-v-google-
public-interest-prevails-digital-copyright-showdown. A ruling in
favor of Perfect 10 on this could have an adverse impact on how
content hosts function such as file and video sharing websites
that link to or host third-party content. On a critical analysis of
the court’s decision on secondary liability, see Anthony Falzone,
The Two Faces of Perfect 10 v. Google (The Center for Internet and
Society, Stanford Law School 16 May 2007), available at: http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5409.
52 See, David Haskel, A Good Value Chain Gone Bad: Indirect Copy-
right Liability in Perfect 10 v. Visa, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 405, 414
(2008). The Ninth Circuit remanded for the district court to decide
the questions whether Google had the requisite knowledge of
primary infringement and failed to take adequately preventative
steps to prevent further damage to Perfect 10 and also whether
Google was protected under x512(d) of the DMCA safe harbor. See
also, Eric Carnevale, Questions of Copyright in Google’s Image Search:
Developments in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 14 B.U. J. Sci. &
Tech. L. 132, (Winter 2008). “The Circuit Court left three issues to
be decided on remand. First, based on a test enunciated by the
Circuit Court, did Google have “knowledge that infringing Perfect
10 images were available using its search engine, and could [have
taken] simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s
copyrighted works, and [fail] to take such steps?” (729) Next, what
is Amazon.com’s potential contributory liability? (733) Lastly, can
Google and Amazon.com limit their liability pursuant to Title II of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)? (733).” (ibid. at 141).
On remand, the district court did not address the issue of Google’s
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement. However, it
did grant in part, and deny in part, Google’s motion for partial
summary judgment of entitlement to safe harbor under x512(d) of
the DMCA for its web and image searches.
53 Sara Ayazi, Search Engines Score Another Perfect 10: The Continued
Misuse of Copyrighted Images on the Internet, 7 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 367,
381e96 (2006).
54 Google trawls the WWW to index videos from any genre and
type including amateur videos, viral advertisements, movie
trailers and music videos.
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providing the HTML code with the video. The service was
launched on 25 January 2005. A year later, in 2006, Google
bought over YouTube,55 and in 2007 Google expanded its
search results on Google Videos search to videos discovered by
their search crawlers from YouTube as well as other video
hosting sites and user websites. The search results are similar
to a combination of Google Web and Google Images. Google
displays a list of videos matching the keyword search verti-
cally with a heading that serves as a link, a two paragraph
description and other information (i.e. uploader, length and
date), a link to “related videos” as well as a screen capture of
a frame of the video that also serves as a jump to the website
hosting the video. Unlike for Google Images, there is no
intermediate page with the Google frame on it. Thus a click on
the link will bring the user directly to the source page with the
video in its original context.
Interestingly, while it is now embroiled in the legal dispute
as the parent company of YouTube for hosting illegal mate-
rials, in early 2009, Google discontinued its own hosting
facilities for the uploading of videos to its own servers.56 Thus
Google Videos search remains distinct from YouTube’s prac-
tices, which accounts for the litigation against YouTube rather
than both Google Videos and YouTube. Later that same year,
Google announced its Google Music search engine for the
United States market,57 which became operational in 2010.58
Google TV was also launched in 2010.59
The outcome of the matter in relation to GIS has direct
repercussions as well for the indexing functions of the GVS.
The same issues relating to the use of thumbnail images for
GIS will apply similarly to the thumbnail-sized screen
captures of videos, although there is no problem with the
display of full images out of context, since a one-step click-on
process brings the user directly to the webpage hosting the
video instead of an intermediate ‘holding’ page.
3.5.2. Developments in other jurisdictions
It is of interest to note that Google also recently concluded
a copyright infringement lawsuit for the GIS in Germany
brought before the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundes-
gerichtshof or “BGH”) by an artist, who had uploaded photos of
her work to her own website, claiming that Google had
infringed her copyrighted works by displaying thumbnail
images of her photos in its image search results.60 Initially the
lower courts ruled that the copyright had been infringed, but
in a way that was justifiable. However, on appeal, the Federal
Supreme Court ruled on 29 April 2010 that the use of the
images was not copyright infringement in the first place
because the artist had effectively consented to the use of the
images. Search engines ‘crawl’ the web’s sites and make
temporary copies of content to improve the performance of
their search engines. Site owners can use ‘disallow’
commands in the website’s code to tell search engines not to
index some or all of their pages or specific file types. Google’s
crawling program, known as “Googlebot”, will ignore images if
a site owner has used the ‘disallow’ command for images. The
plaintiff had not explicitly authorized the use of her works but
she had not blocked her website from being indexed by search
engines which gave Google the implied license or permission
it needed to use her images. As the ‘disallow’ command had
not been used on the artist’s site, the Court ruled that she had
effectively made her works available for Google to use. It
remains to be seen if this liberal trend will take on in other
jurisdictions or if they would prefer the more tentative
approach in the United States. The case however illustrates
that the issue is a global one and that there are strong policy
arguments for preserving image search engine capabilities.
3.6. Problems with current state of law
The outcomeof the current line of cases based ondifferences in
facts and circumstances, and differences in the copyright
holder’s profile including the purpose and use of the image, is
untenable as it affects the neutrality of the search engine’s role
and function in indexing and categorizing various forms of data
or materials. It puts an element of risk in the equation and
ostensibly require search engines to make judgment-based
determinations in order to fully avoid civil liability. The lack of
clarity in the law also creates uncertainty to the legality of
operations and lead to differences of opinion and to disputes. In
some cases, it has perpetuated industry-wide practices that go
against the objectives of copyright law while in others it has
given rise to needless threats and actions for legitimate and
important functions. Clear laws and guidelines are thus
needed. Current laws can affect and impede the function and
utility of search engines for social good; while changes to the
law can set fair and consistent standards for search engines to
follow that will not affect its enhanced functionality.
The current state of the law in this matter for information
locator services vis-a`-vis copyright law is unsatisfactory for
several reasons:
1. In relation to primary infringement for the re-creation of
thumbnails for image identification and as an icon for hyper
55 YouTube, LLC was bought by Google Inc. for US$1.65 billion,
and is now operated as a subsidiary of Google. In its expansion
and diversification of operations and as part of its business
strategy, Google have been acquiring online companies, and in
particular the purchase of YouTube in October 2006 is
noteworthy.
56 Michael Cohen, Turning Down Uploads at Google Video (Official
Google Video Blog, 14 January 2009), available at: http://
googlevideo.blogspot.com/2009/01/turning-down-uploads-at-
google-video.html.
57 Caroline McCarthy, Music Search is Google’s Newest Tune (CNet
News, 28 October 2004), available at: http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1023_3-10385755-93.html. See also, Murali Viswanathan and
Ganesh Ramanarayanan, Making Search More Musical (Official
Google Blog, 28 October 2009), available at: http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2009/10/making-search-more-musical.html.
58 See, Google Music Search Feature at: http://www.google.com/
landing/music/.
59 See, Google TV Search Feature at: http://www.google.com/tv/.
60 File Number IZR 69/08. See, Dr. Amd Haller, Managing
Counsel, Google Germany GmbH, German Supreme Court Rules that
Image Search Does Not Infringe Copyright (Google European Public
Policy Blog, 29 April 2007), available at: http://googlepolicyeurope.
blogspot.com/2010/04/german-supreme-court-rules-that-image.
html, for a reaction by Google Germany to the announcement of
the decision.
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linking to source e the cases on fair use appear to require
search engines to screen the source or origin, use and
purpose of images based on the identity of the copyright
holder and to make judgment-based assessments based on
the merits of each case ab initio to determine whether they
can thumbnail images for search results based on a fair use
assessment. This is something that should be avoided as it
detracts from the efficient functionality of a search engine
and again goes against the basic tenets of existing safe
harbor laws for intermediaries, which is to function on
a content-neutral and comprehensive basis.
2. In relation to the framing of websites and the in-lining of
images not within the context of the source webpage e The
United States case law and trend thus far appear to tolerate
this practice. However, an assessment of its negative
effects to the copyright holders weigh heavily against the
lighter benefits it provides to users seeking only access to
images, irrespective of the legality of their ‘use’, and its
relevance and importance to the search function as a social
benefit. Thus, a benefits-detriment analysis and interest
balancing analysis will clearly favor this as an infringing
practice, which should cease industry-wide.61
3. In relation to secondary infringement actions for use of
third party images as thumbnails for identification and as
hyperlinks, and the provision of links (including deep links)
to the source website irrespective of legitimacy of source e
the basis and reason that render it necessary for statutory
safe harbor protection against third party posted content
against civil liability generally applies likewise to copyright
liability. There should be general copyright exemption or
protection subject to the notice process for search engines
providing links to third party websites that may or may not
contain illegal images and other infringing materials. The
notice process can sufficiently address the concerns of
copyright owners in exchange for immunity.
3.7. Proposed solution under the law
In relation to the re-creation of images into thumbnails for
presentation, identificationandasahyperlink icon to thesource
website, the opt-out model of operation should be made
permissible,62 supplemented by the notice process that should
satisfy the concerns of the copyright holders over third party
websites that contains infringing images. An opt-out model
meansthat there isadefault rightof inclusionof imagesthrough
automated processes that trawls the WWW for cataloging,
which is content and source neutral. Hence, the most suitable
amendment in the law should be to include this exemption
through an extension of the safe harbor protection or a specific
statutory exemption from infringement.63 If an opt-in or
permission has to be sought from all image owners for image
searching, that will cause the images search engine to be
unfeasible for the provider and ineffectual for users. A combi-
nation of permissible performance of reasonable indexing
functions supplemented by an option to opt-out, through a new
“removal request process” that is akin to the notice process, but
functions in relation to legitimate source and legal content, is
a fair trade-off for both parties. Thiswill be further explained in
Section II.
In relation to the framing of websites and in-lining of
images not within the context of the source webpage, there
should be no changes in the law in favor of protecting these
practices.64 In fact, it will be recommended that this practice
should not be allowed based on a balance of interests, bene-
fits-detriment and fairness assessment.65
Finally, in relation to its provision of hyperlinks to third
party websites, what is reasonably required for Google and
others like it to also avoid secondary infringement liability
should be spelled out and clearly defined statutorily, including
through the codification of the elements of secondary (i.e.
contributory and vicarious) infringement, rather than left to
the cases, which can make it a highly subjective exercise,
61 This does not mean that inline linking as a form of technology
will become redundant as it could be permitted in other contexts
and coupled with other practices or safeguards (such as attribu-
tion of source) to render it fairer for the use of such technologies.
Another technology related to inline linking is embedding (such as
video embedding provided by YouTube), which code is generally
expressly given by the owner to encourage dissemination.
62 An implied license theory under contract law can also support
this position. Generally, copyright holders making images avail-
able on public websites do gain an advantage in terms of expo-
sure and traffic from the search engine’s functions.
63 However, the DMCA was clearly inapplicable to the first two
issues in this paper, which relates to its own practices in relation
to copyrighted works that may give rise to primary infringement
liability. In relation to secondary infringement, Google moved for
partial summary judgment in three separate motions that it was
entitled to immunity under three different provisions of the
DMCA: 17 U.S.C. x512(d) for its web and image searches, x512(b)
for its caching feature and x512(c) for its blogger service. For the
purpose of this paper, only x512(d) is relevant to Google’s images
search function. The district court granted in part, and denied in
part, Google’s motion for partial summary judgment of entitle-
ment to safe harbor under x512(d).
64 Although the Perfect 10 case has loosened the knot around the
neck of inline link users, it does not mean that other forms of
technologies that serve the same function or purpose will also
constitute fair use (at least not until judicially sanctioned as fair
use). See e.g., Lee Burgunder and Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline
Web Design After Perfect 10, 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 (Fall 2008),
striking a precautionary note and examining web design tech-
niques in the light of that decision. In particular, they examined
the existing potential for derivative rights violation depending on
“the extent of any alterations, the degree of integration, potential
economic effects, and the amount of control given to website
visitors over the appearance of copyrighted content” (ibid. at 3).
The writers also provided a non-exhaustive list of factors that will
help such technology creators to assess the likelihood of their
exposure to copyright infringement (ibid. at 47).
65 There are also reasons for arguing against the “server test” as
being too focused on the form of technology and inconsistent
with the meaning of the copyright legislation. For example, see,
Christopher Mitchell, Implications of Perfect 10 and Kelly: Why
the Ninth Circuit’s Server Test Misapplies Copyright Principles
and How It Might Provide Loopholes for Direct Copyright
Infringement (The Selected Works of Christopher Mitchell, 2008),
available at: http://works.bepress.com/christopher_mitchell/2,
and Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10
17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 (2008e2009) at 16 and 20. See also, Lee
Burgunder and Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Design After
Perfect 10, 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 (Fall 2008) at 17.
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giving rise to ambiguities in requirements or expectations.66
For example, the Ninth Circuit in the Perfect 10 case reman-
ded the case to the district court for factual findings on the
“reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from
providing access to infringing images”,67 that could give rise to
contributory liability.68 Reasonable response and adherence to
the notice process should lead to immunity under the DMCA
for third party material,69 which immunizes service providers
such as Google from liability for infringement of copyright by
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online
location containing infringing material or infringing activity
through using information location tools, including a direc-
tory, index, reference, pointer or hypertext link, if the service
provider meets certain specified statutory criteria.70 Similarly,
the same “reasonableness” or “expeditiousness” test should
form a part of the removal request process, where the power
still ultimately resides in the copyright owner to control the
use of his work provided he chooses to exercise it rather than
enjoy such rights by default in relation to image search engine
functions.
3.8. Private solutions: Google’s strategy, legal tactics
and best practices
Search engine companies like Google could of course make
private arrangements encouraging copyright holders to
voluntarily relinquish their rights beyond those practices that
are permitted by law. So, search engine operators should also
provide an additional voluntary opt-in option. Another
method is to tap into existing methods for copyright relin-
quishments such as the expressed and unsolicited permission
from the copyright holder for adaptation or use through
a creative commons license; through arrangements between
the search engine and a group of rights holders such as an
image bank, group of companies, members of an industry and
so on; or through agreements to generally refrain from
bringing an action on infringement against Google.71 The
same arrangements can constitute an exception to the general
prohibition from inline linking or framing in the holding page
for an image selected. This is perhaps preferable to judicial
activism through the use of implied license or other similar
doctrines, which can constitute interference in what are
essentially private issues that are more appropriate to be
resolved contractually.
4. Section II e considerations and
recommendations
The important assessment throughout this paper is to deter-
mine if Google as an Internet intermediary and its functions is
a facilitator and hence should be protected or a perpetrator that
should be sanctioned. The suggestion is to provide some level
66 Damon Chetson, Perfect 10 and Contributory Liability: Can Search
Engines Survive?, 9 N.C. J.L. & Tech. On. 1 (2007), examining the
problems of applying the standard of contributory liability to
search engines on the Internet and arguing that the court’s
imputed liability test was not consistent with the US Supreme
Court’s “fault-based” theory of inducement in MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (545 U.S. 913 (2005)) or the substantial non-infringing
use test in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.
S. 417 (1984) (ibid. at 11 and 14). See also, Anthony Falzone, The
Two Faces of Perfect 10 v. Google (The Center for Internet and
Society, Stanford Law School, 16 May 2007), available at: http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5409. “[The Ninth Circuit] held that
Google could be held liable for providing search results that lead
a user to a site with infringing content, so long as Google knew
infringing content was available and could have done something
“simple” to stop it.” The problem is that there is no clear guidance
to search engines on what they must know and the level of
knowledge, general or specific; as well as what constitutes the
“simple” measures that they could take and the threshold of what
is required, especially in the face of changing technology. See
further, Meng Ding, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com: A Step Toward
Copyright’s Tort Law Roots, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 373, 394e402 (2008),
which sees the “simple measures” standard for search engines as
equivalent to the “reasonable alternative design” approach to
product liability cases under tort law (see, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.
com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007) at 1172). However, the writer
also admitted the problems of uncertainty relating to such a test.
67 See, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007)
at 1173.
68 This issue is not within the scope of objective of this paper
and will be dealt with in the context of another article. Suffice it
to note that as the technologies for hyper linking, framing, inline
linking and embedding are integral to the workings of the WWW
in general (and not merely to the functions of search engines) and
they should be statutorily protected unless there are other
extenuating facts and circumstances, other than mere usage, that
should give rise to a finding of secondary infringement.
69 The DMCA notice process places the burden of policing
copyright infringement on the owners of the copyright. See,
Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). The court also
evaluated the requirements or threshold conditions for safe
harbor, including the “reasonable implementation” of a policy to
terminate its services to repeat and blatant infringers (17 U.S.C.
x512(i)), which can function through a working notification
system and other procedures (ibid. at 1109e10).
70 In the Perfect 10 case, the only remaining basis for liability was
on contributory infringement, which was remanded to the
district court to determine through further fact finding because it
did not earlier resolve factual disputes regarding the adequacy of
Perfect 10’s notice of infringement to Google, the adequacy
of Google’s responses to such notice, or the availability to Google
of reasonable and feasible means to halt the direct infringement
using its search engine. See, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2007) at 1173. “Google could be held contributorily
liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to
prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and
failed to take such steps” (ibid. at 1172).
71 E.g., not unlike the settlement in relation to the Google Books
Search Project, except perhaps with less issues of remuneration
as the likely profits attributable to in-lining, direct or indirect, are
lower. Another consideration can be through the use of other
forms of rights-protection technology that will deter or
discourage misappropriation of images such as through the
display of watermarked images or images actually made up of,
and broken up into, several parts.
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of protection for Google in its function as an image search
engine while placing some responsibilities on it as conditions
for it to be eligible for legal exemption from liability.
4.1. Fundamental policy considerations
When consideringGoogle’s proper role in society, it is necessary
and inevitable to lookat thepublic andprivate interests involved
in its functions. Public interest considerations will include
abenefit-detrimentanalysisofnewversustraditionalmediaand
industries, the proliferation of digital information, the imme-
diacy ofnews, theeffects of e-commerce, the greater diversity of
sources of narration and opinion, the rise of user-generated
content (including citizen journalism), commercial and non-
commercial interests, and other socio-economic factors. The
role of Internet intermediaries in relation to these interests and
the effects on copyright owners’ interests are also fundamental.
4.2. Summary of approaches to law reform
The more drastic and fundamental changes will be to reform
copyright law and protection generally to:
1. Require registration of copyright interest in order for eligi-
bility of protection.72 This proposal fundamentally converts
the entire copyright regime from one that enjoys protection
by default and without the need for registration to one that
requires an active assertion of rights.73 A total overhaul can
be problematic given the history of copyright law, the
current body of national and international copyright
instruments and the fact that it may be unnecessary and
too disproportionately strong a response to these prob-
lems.74 Perhaps specific exemptions at the safe harbor
stage or even under copyright law, which currently
contains some specific exemptions, such as the library
exemption, for some of the functions like the indexing
function, can be a more modest but effective alternative to
dealing with the current problems.
2. To elevate fair use as a legal right.75 Generally arguing for
fair use as a right rather than merely a defense, and thus
prima facie legal unless proven otherwise. This will justify
Google proceeding with its initiatives even while litigation
is still ongoing and the law remains ambiguous.76 However,
this is not so much a long-term solution as it is a justifica-
tion for Google’s presumptive practices before the issues
and the legitimacy of the practice are legally resolved,
which still require examination under the fair use test.
Moderate solutions are however probably more realistic
and acceptable, and can resolve most of the disputes. These
involve various degrees of overhaul to the safe harbor and fair
use provisions to sufficiently accommodate Google’s practices
without undue over-extension of protection at the expense of
copyright protections. They include:
1. Extending safe harbors and creating new exemptions with
conditions.77 This will establish certain duties for search
engines while allowing them to continue their functions
that benefit society as a whole and generally optimizing
72 Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda
for Copyright Reform, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 761, 805e10 (2006). The writer
also recommended denying copyrights to unoriginal reproduc-
tions of public domain works (ibid. at 810e4) and reversing what
is seen as the “erosion of the fair use doctrine” (ibid. at 814e24).
73 With the aid of technology, this may be done with ease and at
low cost such as through the establishment of a computerized
registry for opting-in to protection. Such a registry can be set up
by WTO or WIPO with funding for research and development by
international organizations, governments, Google and other
interest parties.
74 Although proponents advocate reforming copyright law to
include a registration based system, this proposal will be difficult
as such a move go against the Berne Convention which did away
with the need to register works before copyright protection is
given. It will also face problems with European conceptions of
copyright protection such as the French’s recognition of a work as
an extension of its author’s personality. See, Pamela Samuelson,
Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, Utah Law Review 551
(2007).
75 Currently, fair use is still largely considered an affirmative
defense. See, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 578 (1994).
This means that the user bears the burden of raising and proving
non-infringement after a prima facie case of copyright infringe-
ment is made out based on the non-authorized usurpation of one
of the exclusive statutory rights. See the landmark Canadian
Supreme Court case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 on the issue as well as the
analysis in Warren Chik, Better a Sword than a Shield: The Case
for Statutory Fair Dealing/Use Right as Opposed to a Defense in
the Light of the Disenfranchising Effect of Digital Rights
Management and Anti-Circumvention Laws, International Journal
of Private Law, 2008 Vol. 1 Nos. 1/2, 157.
76 According to C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of
“Fair Use” Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R. 3d 139, x3c (2004),
some courts regarded fair use as “not an infringement at all”. But
it has been generally regarded as an exception to infringement
with the burden of proof on the defendant. See e.g., Video Pipeline,
Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2003);
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) and Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994),
which states that the defendant bears the burden of proving fair
use in order to avoid the consequences of copyright infringement.
See also, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 561 (1985) and Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997).
77 E.g. Alison R. Watkins, Note, Surgical Safe Harbors: The Family
Movie Act and the Future of Fair Use Legislation, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
241 (2006). The Family Movie Act is an example of statutory safe
harbor for digital indexing projects, relating to the creation and
sale of filtering technology based on the function or action of
technology rather than on a specific entity. Similarly, a digital
library safe harbor could permit any company or organization,
commercial or otherwise, that meets its criterion. A digital library
safe harbor can be based on the creation of an intermediate copy
of full text digital content and the use of internet search engine
technology to access and search the intermediate copy (as long as
only snippets or small and reasonable amounts of text are dis-
played sufficient for the purpose of search and identification of
works and details or information such as author’s name and book
title in order to help in the further research and location of
works); with the pre-condition that the full copy of a copyright
protected work is not distributed and reasonable steps are taken
to secure the full text digital content. Security conditions for
eligibility to statutory protection can also be further spelled out to
prevent damaging ‘leaks’ of information from occurring.
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public and private interests based on principles of utilitar-
ianism. The same policy arguments that paved the way for
specific exemptions in favor of technology enabling the
Internet and WWW to function can be extended to the
usefulness of indexing, cataloging and other functions that
a ‘gateway to the WWW’ provides.78
2. Utilizing and developing the fair use factors to encompass
good practices relating to useful search engine functions. In
the meantime, also using methods and technologies to
maximize usage while minimizing the likelihood of
infringement under the existing copyright system, and
basically working within the copyright system and taking
advantage of existing immunities, exemptions and excep-
tions; and where these do not exist, use contractual
agreements to tailor specific deals with rights holders.
4.3. The proposed approach to law reform
The information locator tools safe harbor provision should be
updated to take into account theoperational needsofnewtypes
of search engines.79 In its current form, it does not provide
protection from a copyright infringement action even for prac-
tices that are meant to facilitate search engine functionality.
The safe harbor provision mainly shields all Internet
intermediaries, including search engines and content hosts,
fromresponsibility for thirdpartymaterials. It isperhapstimeto
include some safety berths from primary infringement actions
for acts and practices that are integral to the effective and effi-
cient functions of the various intermediaries, particularly
searchengines,even if it involves theirownactionsandactivities
relating tocopyrightedworks.After all, themainobjectiveof the
safe harbor provisions is to preserve the essential functions of
Internet intermediaries with a view to safeguarding the gate-
holders of the WWW. This is better than leaving it to litigation
and a fair use analysis that may not conclusively resolve
disputes or harmonize the legal position on the issues.
Alternatively or additionally, new or updated fair use
factors, such as the codification of common law doctrines and
supplementary tests, can provide much needed guidelines
and coherence in the fair use analysis by the courts. This will
hopefully produce more consistent decisions and outcomes
in the future. This is useful particularly if the extension of
safe harbor is considered too drastic a reform. Hence, the
alternative can be to extend the same protection in the form of
a specific fair use defense rather than as a right to immunity,
or at the very least, the same considerations, if not provisions,
can be legislated as additional fair use factors to meet their
immediate needs.
This is not to say that all search engine practices are
necessary or legitimate. Thus, for instance, the separate
browser for full images outside of the context of the webpage
wherein it also appears, and which necessitates an additional
‘step’ in the click-on process for users, may not be a suitable
candidate for any form of statutory protection or exemption.
There is a distinction between “want” and “need” in each of
these issues that may not be easy to draw, hence the need to
constantly revisit and recalibrate public policy and private
interests on the matter.
Before the actual proposals are made, there are some
important things that should be kept in mind when consid-
ering legislative amendments to deal with the problems
highlighted in this paper:
1. First, copyright law is one of the most amended legislation
because it does not involve absolute rights or wrongs
(unlike other areas of law such as criminal law) but rather
a balance of rights between more than one stakeholder in
creative works. Thus, it requires recalibration as contexts
change, and there is no greater change to the treatment and
attitudes toward creative works than the digitization of its
form and electronic delivery.80
2. Second, although it was initially about lack of control and
Internet intermediaries dealing with third party materials,
there is no reason why protections and exemptions cannot,
given the changes and progress made in recent years, be
considered for extension even to narrow situations where
theydealwithcopyrightedworksas theprimaryorfirstparty,
which may be justifiable based on private rights balancing
and the public and social benefits of their functions.
3. Third,asnoted, thereareseveralways that thesechangescan
come about, such as through additional, amended or
expanded statutory safe harbors; new specific fair use
provisions such as those that we have seen relating to
caching anddigital back-ups, or expanded fair useprovisions
(e.g. the library archiving exemption can be amended to
extend tonon-library archives) and expanded fair use factors
consisting of new and codified tests and considerations.81
4. Fourth, the spirit and purpose of copyright law should not
be overlooked in favor of the form and technicality of
the technology. Whilst copyright law should adapt to deal
with technology, it should remain technology neutral in
78 E.g., extending the statutory ‘caching’ exemption for copying
to improve the accuracy and usefulness of the search function.
See, Jesse S. Bennett, Caching In on the Google Books Library
Project: A Novel Approach to the Fair Use Defense and the DMCA
Caching Safe Harbors, 35 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1003, 1034e7 (Summer
2008). As noted, 17 U.S.C. x512(b) of the DMCA provides a safe
harbor for system caching as long as the content is intermediate
and temporary; made available by another; requested by a third
person and stored through an automatic technical process. Goo-
gle’s caching of taken-down website content should also be
addressed in such a provision.
79 Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the
DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 437 (2008) and Joris
van Hoboken, Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: On the Need to
Update Selection Intermediary Liability in the EU, Int’l J. Comm. L.
& Pol’y 49 (Winter 2009).
80 E.g., the amendments under the DMCA dealing with many
aspects of information technology, some of which are accom-
modating including provisions exempting system and user
caching under the safe harbor provisions; while other amend-
ments serve to manage or control digital forms of works such as
the Digital Rights Management provisions.
81 Consultations should be made, which is expected as part of
the legislative process, and Notes from Parliamentary Debates
and Preparatory or Explanatory Notes should also be available for
reference to provide clarity and guidance of the application and
coverage of the new and amended provisions.
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application particularly given the rapidity of technological
progress.
5. Fifth, if there are more streamlined or concise solutions to
deal with several problems, then that approach should be
taken. For example, the use of website descriptions,
reduced-sized images and even news snippets can collec-
tively be addressed by a single safe harbor provision or fair
use exemption, or by several subject matter neutral fair use
factors.
4.4. New safe harbor provisions or specific fair use
exemptions for search engine indexing tools
Indexing is identified here as a main function with significant
social benefits that outweigh the protectionist interests of
copyright holders and for which statutory protections or
exemptions should be extended. The indexing-related func-
tions are practices that are necessary for the catalog and
search functions that provide ordering of WWW content that
is essential to its public utility. It will cover the adaptation of
works and its display that will be considered necessary for
such purposes, irrespective of the form or type of work, and
will cover the thumbnail of image icons, screen capturing of
video content, sampling of music content and the provision of
webpage content headings and description. This function will
specifically protect Internet search engines and other indexers
(e.g. Intranet search services). The modifications made for
indexing and presentation purposes should avoid mere
duplication (unlike the display of full-sized images or a full
text, or the streaming of an entire song).
This amendment, together with the existing safe harbor
provisions, will effectively permit and legitimize the following
activities or functions currently practiced by Google (and the
same or similar functions of other online entities) specifically
in relation to its images search engine and video search
engine83 e
a. Thumbnails (reduced-sized versions) of images for the
purpose of facilitating search results presentation (first
party adaptation and display).
b. Screen captures (reduced-sized still versions) of videos
and content descriptions for the purpose of facilitating
efficient search results presentation (first party adaptation
and display).
c. Providing hyperlinks (including deep links) to third party
websites that may contain illegal images (third party
material).
4.4.1. Instituting a “removal request process” in addition to
the notice process for protected activities not relating to third
party material
It is to be noted that these amendments effectively recognize
and legitimize a very important carve-out of the copyright
framework, which is the ‘opt-out’ practice currently taken by
Google. In order to ensure a fair balance of rights and interests
between the parties, meet the preferences of copyright
owners and offset the effects of the limited opt-out exemp-
tions that can result from the above reforms, a simple
streamlined process to ‘opt-out’ from inclusion to its
programs, known as the “removal request process” with the
onus on the copyright owner, should be provided. This
resembles and functions in a similar manner to the notice
process or regime and is a concession or compromise for the
statutorily sanctioned incursion of rights. It will be
a companion process to the current “notice regime” (i.e. the
statutory notice-and-take-down process). The “removal
request regime” relates to Google’s direct use of copyrighted
materials, and what would otherwise (if not for the safe
harbor or exemption) be primary infringement in its part,
while the notice process relates to third party material, and
the possibility of secondary infringement by Google. The
format and procedure for this removal request process can
resemble the notice process (but without the put-back
procedure) and may be simplified and automated, as they are
likely to be non-contentious. If it is to be put into place, then it
has to be made a pre-condition for eligibility to statutory
protection (i.e. safe harbor or specific exemption under the
Copyright Act).84
The extension of a similar procedure for request removal
extends the notice process beyond illegal content uploaded by
third parties to legal content uploaded by Google (in relation to
GIS and GBS) as permitted under statute but that is subject to
the paramount right of the copyright holder to actively assert
his exclusive rights. Thus, the failure to provide a streamlined
process for request removal and to respond expeditiously to
such requests will remove the intermediary from its protec-
tion. This reinforces the narrow acceptance of an opt-out
process that is in effect a reversal of the copyright default
rights.
Table 3 e Template for a safe harbor or statutory
exemption provision for the indexing function.
Indexing of Information
A service provider shall not be liable for the modification and
display of information in a directory, catalog or index for the
purpose of organizing information, and shall also not be liable for
providing the technical means to transport a user to its source,
whether or not as an information locator tool in relation to
search results, for the purpose of making more efficient the
function of indexing the information, on condition that the
provider, upon receiving a removal request, acts expeditiously to
remove the copy of the information.82
82 However, other existing conditions for eligibility will have to
be excluded for obvious reasons such as the requirement of an
effective policy to deal with instances of repeat infringement (by
another) and the support of standard technical measures for the
protection of works (except insofar as Google itself does not
circumvent such measures). See, 17 U.S.C. x512(i).
83 Insofar as its model of presentation is concerned, it is simi-
larly addressed by the proposed amendments in relation to
indexing and display.
84 See Table 3. If amendment to the fair use factor approach is
preferred as the alternative to this higher form of protection, then
the intermediary’s own practices in relation to complaints and
requests for removal can be relevant and given due weight, such
as in relation to the factors of good faith and counter-measures.
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4.5. Updated fair use factors under the general fair use
exception provision85
The mildest option for legal reform is to add to the list of fair
use factors in the general fair use provision, which includes
both a codification of additional tests or factors developed by
the courts in common law jurisdictions as well as proposed
additional new factors in the list of fair use factors for judicial
analysis. Although this list is non-exhaustive, explicitly
written factors often carry greater weight and more attention
than extraneous ones. Moreover, they require the judge to
apply them if applicable unlike additional unstated factors.86
Another useful approach is to expound on existing factors
for the digital context.
The following is an expanded list of fair use factors and the
elucidation of existing factors specifically relevant to the
online context that can be considered with the bases or
reasons for the proposed amendment:87
1. The inclusion of a fair use consideration to the first fair use
factor for when a use is transformative in nature and is
non-consumptive. This acknowledges the relevance of
alternative or incidental uses of works beyond the original
intended use that has benefits to society, andwhere the use
does not rely on or focus primarily on the creative aspect of
the work. This is an expansion of the first fair use factor on
“the purpose and character of the dealing”. In fact, the
manner of the use and the format of the work and the
unauthorized use can significantly change the original
“nature of the work or adaptation”.
2. The second fair use factor on “the amount and substanti-
ality of the part copied” should be clarified. “Substantiality”
have traditionally and largely referred to the quality and
quantity of the part used. However, it should also be made
clear that it includes format, size, resolution, color and so
on. The application of copy-protect security devices such as
watermarks should also be taken into consideration. The
reference to the amount copied “taken in relation to the
whole work or adaptation use in relation to the whole work
or adaptation” should thus not qualify or limit the earlier
reference to substantiality.88
3. The use has consequential or incidental benefits that offset
or outweighs the detriment to the copyright owner. For
example, information locator tools benefit copyright
holders through referrals (i.e. linking to actual websites)
leading to traffic to and interest in their website and the
works contained therein, as they serve as a directory and
provides free advertisement and publicity.89 This relates to
the fourth fair use factor on “the effect of the dealing upon
the potential market for, or value of, the work or adapta-
tion” and highlights the fact that the unauthorized use can
on the whole benefit rather than disadvantage the market
in a type of work as determined by a financial impact
assessment.
4. A Counter-Measure factor, which takes into account
reasonable technological, such as filtering, screening and
identifying technologies, and non-technological methods
to counteract or prevent detriment to and abuse of rights
will be relevant and useful, particularly in an increasingly
technology-driven digitized and networked environment.90
For example, the use of watermarking and other forms of
preventative technology will be relevant and favorable to
the user.91 In fact, courts in various jurisdictions have
occasionally made reference to the state of technology and
85 The inclusion of new fair use factors is not common but it has
been done. For example, Singapore’s Copyright Act (Cap. 63)
includes a fifth factor to the usual four factors in section 35(2)(e):
“The possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within
a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial price.” This factor
focuses on society’s interest in the availability of, and access to,
works. ‘New’ fair use analyses can bring into focus more public
and social good or interests and other private interests such as
technological interests rather than as it currently exists which
appears mainly through the lens and perspective of the rights
holder.
86 The only drawback is that these additional factors may be too
fact specific and may be redundant in the analysis in relation to
other non-intermediary usage, giving rise to a large number of
neutral or inapplicable results in the legal application process.
87 As noted, the existing factors may already be adequate to
address some of the disputes and concerns involves in these new
technology and services such as the display of snippets of infor-
mation (contra. display of reduced-sized images, which is a rela-
tively newer practice) which does not differ much from the issues
of fair use that predates the digital age (except insofar as the
factual considerations can change the application, applicability,
weightage and overall assessment of the factors).
88 However, this latter portion is still relevant. For instance, the
use of a work relative to other components of a re-use within its
context is still relevant in some cases, for example the use of
a song in an original YouTube video where the images and
choreography are original. Also, in the digital context, substan-
tiality is also relevant in assessing the likelihood or risk and the
volume or level of consequential infringement (i.e. a ‘domino
effect’ or escalation of infringement) to be expected in order to
determine if it is an acceptable level when compared to the
benefits of the service, which creates those conditions. This
illustrates the effects of optimization and of utilitarianism at
work as the benefits and detriment may relate to different
parties, but if the benefits outweigh the detriment as a whole then
the practice concerned is more acceptable.
89 Traditionally fair use relate to actions that are mainly detri-
mental to the copyright holder’s interests, but the irony is that in
modern technology there are many objectionable practices that
actually do also have benefits for rights holders, and these have
been taken into account in cases whether in the context of an
existing factor (thus diluting its weightage, impact or impor-
tance), as an additional non-enunciated factor to consider and
add to the equation, in the form or as part of a ‘new’ doctrine to
supplement an existing factor like the transformative use
doctrine or as a general observation. This is an important factor
for a fairness analysis, but this time, also taking into account the
defendant’s perspective.
90 It can be noted that this bears some relation to the require-
ment to accommodate and not interfere with standard technical
measures for the protection of works, which is currently a pre-
requisite for safe harbor eligibility. See, 17 U.S.C. x512(i)(B).
However, in this instance, it relates to Google’s own practices to
safeguard the interests of rights holders with regards to their
copyrighted works in the course of its own use of those works.
91 For the archiving exemption in particular, which will be rec-
ommended in Part Two, adequate safeguards against highly
damaging effects of ‘leaks’, which can open the floodgates of
third party infringement, will obviously be an important consid-
eration here, and even the display of works can be copy-protected
as a form of digital Technological Rights Management (TRM).
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the use of counter-technology to prevent, limit or eliminate
infringement, for example, the High Court in the Australian
Kazaa case.92 The courts have also looked at the motives
and actions of the Internet intermediary, with the US
Supreme Court in the Grokster case referring to a “non-
inducement” doctrine.93 Thus, increasingly, the “fairness”
of the use relates not only to the technicality of use but also
the intentions and behavior or practices of the user. This
was also the point raised in by the Ninth Circuit in the
Perfect 10 case, although it would be useful if there is greater
elucidation on the reasonableness test and factors deter-
mining reasonableness (e.g. the state of technology, market
availability, cost and effort, likelihood and percentage of
success, etc.) and proportionality of response, which is
perhaps a task that will have to be left to the courts. Also,
non-technological measures like warnings and under-
taking requirements, profit-sharing, compensation and
private arrangements, research funding, a robust notice
process and removal request process, and other measures
may also be relevant for this and for the good faith factor,
below.
5. A Good Faith factor analyzing the motive and intention of
the use and the behavior and practices of the user and
facilitator. For example, unfair competition and misappro-
priation of works and the lack of any good faith or legiti-
mate interest in a use or service will be taken against the
perpetrator; while attempts to limit or prohibit copyright
infringement through the development of technological
and non-technological methods, warning of and non-
inducement of consequential infringement shows good faith
and will be favorable for the facilitator.94 In assessing good
faith or the lack thereof, at least in relation to the facilitator,
the actions of the corporate entity should be relevant
instead of the individual actions of its employees (i.e. a sort
of “corporate veil” should extend to such a situation); hence
the test should be an objective one.95
6. A Personal Use factor, to allow for personal and non-
commercial uses such as the creation of digital duplicates,
in certain cases reformatting them, in order to play it on
other devices and the creation of back-up copies of
a programor information in the event that the original copy
is accidentally destroyed or lost. Themaking of a back-up of
computer programs is already a popular exception to
infringement. This factor is primarily relevant for the
individual user.
All these factors can be incorporated into the current
provision with some amendments in the followingmanner as
proposed in Table 4.
I believe that this additional and expounded list of factor,
which provides more detailed, important and relevant new
considerations, will guide or steer the courts to reach the same
or similar results as the recommended changes to safe harbor
or specific exemption provisions. These factors have also been
stated in a general manner so that it remains technology
neutral and can be also be applicable to future types of uses
other than those examined in this paper. For instance, the
“transformative use” test has been successfully used for
different types of uses since its discovery. These amendments
to the fair use factors will take into account the unique nature
of the uses that Internet intermediaries put creative works to,
taking into account their objectives and purposes, whereas
the original factors were mainly focused on the user as
primary infringer and as the primary subject for a fair use
examination. Also, it must be noted that, unlike the safe
harbor provisions, the fair use defense can also apply to
a cause of action on secondary infringement; hence, the
development of additional tests by the United States courts in
the Sony Betamax to Grokster line of cases under common law
and the proposed expansion have to take into account the
services of Internet facilitators through the interpretation of
existing factors and the addition of new ones.
Table 4 e Example of proposed amendments to the U.S. fair use provision.
The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of a copyright. In determining whether the usemade of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include [but are not limited to]:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes and
whether such use is of a transformative nature or is for a consumptive purpose;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work and the nature of the use, including personal use;
3. the amount and substantiality e
a. of the portion, including its used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole and substantiality includes format, size, resolution and
other features of use that distinguishes it from the original work;
b. of infringing uses as compared to non-infringing [in relation to the services of a technologicalmedium ormedia for communication and
transfer];
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work; and
5. the copyrighted work was used in good faith and reasonable and proportionate measures have been taken to protect the copyrighted
work from infringement.
92 Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings
Ltd., [2005] FCA 1242.
93 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
94 The notion of good faith have either been explicitly taken into
consideration in the judge’s decision making on safe harbor and
fair use (see, e.g. Io Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. C06-03926
HRL, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, San Jose
Division), or are implicit in their assessment of the intermediary’s
actions. It is also implicit in the notions of fairness under the fair
use doctrine, and in the pre-requisites for safe harbor protection
(i.e. lack of knowledge, no control or direct financial gain) and
even its threshold requirements to prevent repeat infringers and
institute technical measures.
95 See judge Louis L. Stanton’s opinion, which influenced his
decision, in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
2103 (SDNY, 2010), which involved a plethora of evidence on
incriminating communications on both sides of the dispute.
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Legal reform need not be confined to one alternative or
another and can be a mixture depending on which exemption
or limitation is more important and hence deserving of legal
instruments offering stronger and earlier forms of protection,
and which practices justify lesser forms of protection or only
require statutory clarification. Whichever the preferred
approach to legal reform, the status granted by immunity and
the importance and priority given to the expressed list of
factors makes any changes to them highly important and
impactful on future decisions on the issues.
4.6. Practices determined to be unjustified and not
eligible for protection
Although the suggested reforms made above are favorable to
Google there are some current practices and actions that
should not be eligible for protection, and hence the industry-
wide practices or abuses relating to these practices should
cease, unless private arrangements or settlement agreements
are made that does not go against public policy interests. For
Google Images Search Engines (GIS), it includes framing of the
webpage that contains the image and providing a holding
page after the selection of an image by a user providing the
option of inline linking to only the full image in a separate
browser windows out of context of the image in the web-
page.96 Technically, the material is not copied, but in reality it
has the same detrimental effects of being copied.97 Fair use is
inapplicable here.
5. Conclusion
The importance of socio-economic activities on the Internet
for work, play and study in the future cannot be understated
and the role of the Internet intermediary such as the search
engine is integral and have to be largely protected but in
a manner that is as fair to rights holders of creative works as
possible. It is hoped that the evaluation conducted in this
article will put the issues and matters relating to search
engine functionality into perspective, that the proposals will
be useful and seriously considered and that it will generate
continued discussion with a view to more concrete solutions
for all parties concerned.
Warren B. Chik (warrenchik@smu.edu.sg) Asst Prof of Law,
Singapore Management University, Singapore
96 Thus preferring the spirit of the “incorporation test” over the
technicality of the “server test”.
97 Although the “server test” would determine that there was
technically no copying, the objective of the exclusive right of
duplication should be instructive as the deleterious effects on the
rights holders would be the same. Moreover, there is also the
display right, which have also been infringed by such practices.
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